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CANADA, COPYRIGHT, COMPUTERS
PREFACE

As the 1980s have drawn to a close, many writers, commentators
and other delineators of social evolution find it fruitful to look back,
reminisce and distill the essence of the past ten years. This decennial
post-mortem is customary and, moreover, provides writers suffering
from writer's block a wealth of material, as well as handsome
paychecks. They strive to collect those events, people and things which
had a profound impact on the decade. As hippies, protests and Woodstock symbolized the Sixties, the symbols for the Eighties remain to be
proclaimed.
Occasionally, I find myself engaged in exactly this type of sociological broad-stroke painting. I remarked to a friend recently that my personal computer and its word-processing capabilities saved my life in
meeting deadlines numerous times during law school. To underscore
this point, I bemoaned my lack of adequate typing skills and further
pointed out that the last time I actually typed out an essay on a real
typewriter was when I was a freshman at Stanford, way back at the beginning of the decade (lo! those many years ago). It then struck me that
the personal computer has, in that short time, effectively penetrated offices, schools, governments and, well, society. Thus, the computer and
computer software certainly must qualify as one of the "symbols of the
Eighties."
Because of its widespread impact, computer technology has become
a rich and complex subject to explore. More specifically, computers interface with the law in a multitude of ways. Therefore, any article
which tackles this subject runs the risk of becoming dangerously complex. It is precisely to avoid this complexity that I have included this
very unscholarly and rather informal preface for the benefit of you, the
reader (and, I must confess, for my own benefit as a writer, in order to
get a firmer grasp on what I wanted to say overall). I want to make
clear from the outset what it is I am trying to say, what the Big Picture
is.
In general terms then, this is what this Article is all about: this Article will address copyright protection for computer software, in three
parts. First, the Article will start with an examination of how Canada,
as a case study, reached the decision to grant full copyright protection
to software. Second, this Article will compare Canada's protection system with the systems of other nations. Third, the Article will discuss
the impact of international software copyright protection on international trade.
I chose to start with Canada as a case study because it was timely,
in that the Canadian government just recently amended their copyright
laws. More importantly, I believe that Canada provides an excellent
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case model for what has and will yet happen in many other countries. I
also chose to analyze the Canadian case model by using a theoretical
framework, developed by Prof. Vincent Brannigan. This theory,
"technico legal revolutions," is specifically tailored to address situations
in which the law and technology interact.
My friends have (repeatedly) stressed the importance of a "theme"
with which I can illuminate this field and help the practicing attorney.
I should be so bold as to presume to actually help a practicing attorney,
but the effort must be made. Since my Article is in three parts, I
thought the theme should follow the same structure. First, my theme is
that granting full copyright protection for computer software is excessive because it stretches a legal doctrine beyond the bounds it can reasonably cover. I believe the legal conflict in Canada underscores the
problems people have with software copyright protection. Second, pressure from the U.S. and computer industries is leading the rest of the
world to follow Canada's example, regardless of what I might think.
(So that goes to show you how much influence I have). Third, full copyright protection will, on the whole, hurt international trade because it
unfairly favors the developed nations which already have strong
software industries at the expense of under-developed nations. Now,
I'm not saying protecting software is bad; just that there must be better
ways to protect it than through copyright law.
Well, that's my preface. I hope my rambling about "symbols of the
Eighties" helps you appreciate the importance that computer technology has in the world and in our future. I hope you can keep in mind the
overall structure of my Article. I hope my meager scratchings will be of
some help to some practicing attorney somewhere, if only to help me
vindicate my friends' expectations of me. And I hope I have not unduly
offended any readers by starting this Article with the informal and decidedly un-academic tone of this preface. I swear it will never happen
again.
P.H.K.
Spring 1989
Washington, D.C.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, advancements in science and technology have
created new forms of wealth, power, and status. These developments
upset pre-existing notions of legal ownership, duties, and rights because
they do not fit squarely within pre-existing legal regimes. This, in turn,
fosters an atmosphere of uncertainty and extreme caution, which stifles
technical advancement. The result is that society is harmed by slowing
the spread of socially beneficial developments.
Often, the legal system is unable to protect this new form of wealth
without creating a new form of legal protection. For example, the development of the printing press and the concomitant rise of the publishing industry forced the legal systems of Europe to develop the copyright
system. Legal systems, which, common sense tells us, are generally
conservative by nature, have customarily been slow to adapt to the
often rapid changes that technological advancements produced. Since
technological developments occur worldwide, this problem is not unique
to any one legal system or any one culture. However, the society which
first develops a particular technology is usually the first to adapt its
legal system. This adaptation occurs simply as a consequence of a particular society being the first historically to undergo the developments.
In the second half of the twentieth century, the United States rose
as a major world power, not only militarily but also in terms of scientific accomplishments and trade. Major advances in medicine, energy
production, and electronics have spread from the U.S. to the rest of the
world. Because Canada enjoys close ties to the U.S., economically, culturally, and of course geographically, it is in a unique position to absorb
this technology. But Canada has also had to deal with the legal
problems these technical advancements can create.
The tremendous leaps in knowledge witnessed in this author's lifetime alone have now made it imperative that legal systems respond
more dexterously to technological progress. Technological advances
have been occurring much more rapidly in this century than in any previous century. As more resources are invested in research by governments, companies, and universities, the pace of development can only be
expected to rise. This is especially true in the scientific realm, where
past achievements become the launching point for future research. If
the legal systems of the world, and most importantly the legal systems
of the developed nations where the largest proportion of research takes
place, do not become better at adapting to scientific advances, the
problems of uncertainty, caution and stifling technology may hinder the
future progress of society. Thus, like science, the law must keep pace
with technological developments by building on the past to address the
future.
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The new high-technology industries pose the latest generation of
problems for society. Biotechnology, satellite broadcasting, nuclear
power, and genetic engineering have all created their own unique
problems and demand more responsive judicial treatment. Perhaps in
no other area is this more evident than in the field of computer science.
Computers are a vital cornerstone of scientific and economic advancement. The importance of computers to society is perhaps best highlighted by the fact that Time magazine named the computer as its Man
of the Year for 1983.1 The rise of the Silicon Age has created mighty
industrial empires, new forms of knowledge and skill, and most importantly, new forms of wealth. Some of the largest wars waged in this
field during the past decade have determined the control and ownership
of these new forms of wealth, especially computer software. While this
conflict has raged in practically every industrial and post-industrial nation, Canada presents a particularly vivid example. This is punctuated
by recent amendments to the Canadian Copyright Act of 1924, which
bring Canada squarely to the forefront of this issue.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the development and impact of copyright protection for computer software. The first part of
this Article will detail Canada's progress from giving no protection for
software to granting full copyright protection. The analysis will be
aided by applying Prof. Brannigan's theory of Technico Legal Revolutions.2 This Article will argue that copyright is an imperfect solution to
software protection and that Canada's problematic and twisted road towards copyright evinces the inadequacy of this protection scheme.
Analysis of the way Canada has treated this problem is valuable because it provides a model for what has happened in several nations, notably Japan and Australia. Thus, Canada's experience provides a model
for what could happen in other nations.
Second, this Article will examine the international impact of this
Canadian development. This Article will compare Canada's protection
scheme with those of other nations, taking into special account Canada's
relationship with the U.S. and other common law jurisdictions. This
Article will then analyze Canada's response as part of an international
trend. Although copyright is an imperfect protection system for computer software, international political pressure from the U.S. and the
major software companies has forced many nations to follow Canada's
1. Friedrich, Machine of the Year: The Computer Moves In, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 14.
2. Brannigan & Dayhoff, Medical Informatics: The Revolution in Law, Technology
and Medicine, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 1 (1986); V. Brannigan, Technico Legal Revolutions (Sept.
8, 1988) (unpublished course materials); V. Brannigan, Biotechnology: A First Order
Technico Legal Revolution (Sept. 8, 1988) (unpublished journal article manuscript and
course materials). The author would like to acknowledge Professor Brannigan's contributions to this Article and thank him for his assistance in its development.
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path. Therefore, the current trend among nations is towards copyrighting software. Through an excursion into comparative law and by examining the relevant international conventions, most notably the
Universal Copyright Convention 3 and the Berne Convention, 4 this Article will put Canada's legal evolution into an international context.
Finally, this Article will evaluate the impact the new Copyright Act
will have on high-technology trade patterns involving not only Canada,
but also the United States, the European Community, Japan, and developing nations. The impact of domestic copyright laws on international
trade will be discussed. Finally, this Article will argue that full copyright protection for software will primarily benefit the Western industrialized nations and will hurt under-developed states. Therefore, this
section will highlight the breadth of impact that computer technology
can have, by developing the international legal, economic and political
issues it generates.
II. BACKGROUND

A. OVERVIEW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
The evolution of digital computers is marked by an increase in computational power and a corresponding decrease in size and costs. Electronic computers evolved from the early vacuum tube models in the
1930s to transistor technology in the 1950s to integrated circuitry in the
1960s and finally to Very Large Scale integrated circuitry imbedded on
semi-conductor silicon chips which we have today.5 A digital computer
uses switches which are binary. They have two "states:" either "on"
(current flowing) or "off" (no current flowing). In this binary code, any
number can be represented, and a compilation of this code becomes the
data and information that most people understand to be the bread and
6
butter of computers.
Computers have five basic components: input, memory, control,
logic, and output. Input consists of any device that gets data into the
computer. Memory is any device that stores information, be it data or
programs. Main memory is usually contained in the core of the
machine in a semi-conductor chip, which is a very small binary circuit
made from silicon. Read-only memory ("ROM") is memory which cannot be erased and is usually found in a semi-conductor chip. Logic de3. Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324
[hereinafter U.C.C.].
4. Berne Convention, Sept. 9, 1886, 331 U.N.T.S. 217.
5. J. MANN, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW IN CANADA 12 (1987). The initial

section of this Article draws heavily on the Mann text as well as on this author's personal
experience with computers.
6. Id. at 7.
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vices are part of the computer's central processing unit ("CPU") and
are hardwired to perform logical and arithmetic functions, such as addition, subtraction, and logical comparisons. Control devices regulate the
flow of data between the input, processing, data storage/memory, and
output devices. Finally, the output devices, like printers, produce data
7
or the results of computation.
The word "software" refers to any information concerned with the
operation of a computer. While this definition includes information
such as data, this Article will use the word "software" to refer only to
computer programs. The word "hardware" refers to any of the physical
devices that actually make up the elements of a computer, as outlined
above. 8 The distinction between hardware and software becomes less
clear when computer programs are engraved on unerasable ROM chips.
This blurred boundary between hardware and software has created
much of the legal problems in this area.
After a program is input into a computer, a "compiler" or "interpreter" of some kind translates the human-readable source code into
machine-readable object code. A computer's CPU processes electrical
impulses by opening and closing switches and thus regulates the flow of
electrical current. Since the CPU "understands" object code, it is important to remember that true object code is nothing more than sets of
electrical impulses, usually of either +5 or 0 volts. Although object
code may be represented by binary or hexadecimal notation, the actual
"code" itself is not human-readable since it consists of a series of electrical states.9
This distinction between human-readable code and object code was,
in Canada, suggested as a basis for determining when to grant different
levels of protection. Application computer programs are generally
designed to perform user-oriented tasks, such as word processing. Operating System programs deal with the internal workings of the computer.' 0 The distinction between application and operating system
programs was suggested as another means of distinguishing between
different levels of protection.

B. THEORY OF TECHNICO LEGAL REVOLUTIONS
The law has been reactionary, at best, toward new scientific developments. In many instances, the legal system has obdurately clung to
outmoded or inappropriate modes of thought when confronted with in7. Id. at 7-12.
8. Id. at 15-16.
9. Id. at 13-15; Sinnott, Copyright in Operating System Software on Computer Chips:
A Tale of Two Apples, 3 INTELL. PRop. J. 1, 36 (1987).
10. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 15.
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novations in the technical and scientific fields. Often, new technical
skills will not fit into a pre-existing legal structure. There will, therefore, be a period when the judiciary and the legislature must somehow
come to grips with the new technology. Competing interests and conflicting points of view will attempt to guide the judiciary in hashing out
rights and responsibilities. Eventually, the system will make accommodations for the new technology and will resolve the dispute. This is, in
essence, a Technico Legal Revolution."
Every technico legal revolution passes through four particular
stages: 1) the Autonomy Phase, 2) the Conflict Phase, 3) the Determination Phase and 4) the Resolution Phase. There is no set time limit on
each phase; the amount of time spent in each depends on the particular
circumstances of each technico legal revolution. However, every
12
technico legal revolution must pass through all four.
In the Autonomy Phase, the parties who develop a particular technology act with little or no restraint, either from the legal system or society. In the Conflict Phase, some party or parties arise who challenge
the original developers. The challengers in the case of computer
software were the software copiers, or pirates. In the Determination
Phase, each side gathers the facts and arguments it needs to resolve the
conflict in its favor. In the final phase, the Resolution Phase, the legal
system finally assigns a legal structure to the technological innovation.
The legal system accepts one side's facts and arguments, and thereby
uses the legal regime promoted by that party as the proper analogous
system. One highlight of this phase is how the court allocates the burden of proof with respect to unknown factors. As is true in many other
3
areas of the law, the party with the burden of proof often loses.'
Evolution of computer software is an instance of technico legal
revolution. This section of this Article will examine the revolution concerning proprietary rights in this new technology. This Article will detail the steps taken by the participants in the Canadian struggle for
computer software ownership through all four phases of the technico
legal revolution. Finally responding to pressure from the U.S. and the
computer industry, the Canadian government recently enacted an
amendment to its Copyright Act, making specific provisions for computer software. Therefore, this Article will emphasize this new legislation as the resolution to this technico legal revolution. The fact that it
took sixty-six years for the Canadian government to make any amendment to its Copyright Act underscores the long and tortuous path that
both legislative reform and technico legal revolutions can take.
11. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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DISCUSSION: THE TECHNICO LEGAL REVOLUTION

The basic conflict is that the software industry in Canada was attacked by software copiers. Because the legal status of software was indeterminate, software copiers could copy legitimately manufactured
software for a fraction of the cost. The so-called software pirates or
counterfeiters could reap profits because they did not have to pay for
the initial costs of research, development, and marketing. On the other
hand, the legitimate software vendors found themselves competing
against their own products. Canada's outdated Copyright Act made no
mention of electronic devices, much less computers, and thus the legitimate merchants had no legal shield against the software pirates. The
pirates were aware of this legal void and took full advantage of the situ14
ation to undercut the legitimate market.
A.

AUTONOMY PHASE

This technico legal revolution is unique in several aspects. First,
the actions by the original technologists were both unfettered and unprotected. The original software manufacturers acted without restraint,
but without harming anyone. It was not until economic challengers,
armed with new copy-making technology, started infiltrating markets
and eroding profits that the conflict arose. Typically, a party who develops a new technology will exploit the probability that the law relating
to the new technology is unsettled and lagging. In this case, however,
that strategy backfired. Since the law did not afford a legal shield for
the developers, it was a detriment to the software manufacturers and a
boon to their challengers.
This particular technico legal revolution is also unique because the
Autonomy Phase is dualistic. The length of this phase and its effects
are significantly different when viewed from the positions of the parties
in conflict. The duality of this occurred when the developers of the
technology became the victims after their challengers turned software
copying tools against them.' 5 The effects of this dual autonomy will impact the later stages of this technico legal revolution. Perhaps the twosidedness of this technico legal revolution is a result of the fact that
14. Copyright Act, CAN. REV. STAT., ch. C-30, § 2 (1970) (hereinafter Copyright Act].
The Copyright Act defines protected literary works as: "every original production in the
literary, scientific or artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets, and other writings, lectures, dramatic or dramatico-musical works, musical works or compositions with or without words, illustrations, sketches,
and plastic works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science." Id. There is
no mention of electronics in the Copyright Act.
15. Betts, High-Tech PiratesSaid to Reap Billions, COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 14, 1988, at
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there are two principal actors, both of whom rely on the technology to
achieve their goals.
The Autonomy Phase for the original developers of Canadian
software was relatively long. The first electric computers, using vacuum tubes, were built in 1939.16 It was not until 1985 that the first Canadian Court of Appeals even heard a copyrightability of software
case.17 Therefore, the original computer developers had virtual free
rein in Canada for approximately forty years. The nature of the technology was such that, during most of this time period, it was both unprofitable and difficult to copy software. It is perhaps most telling that
the innovators relied heavily upon trade secret law to protect their
works during most of this period.' 8 Not until the boom in microcomputers did the technology reach a level where anyone could copy
software with little training. When mass marketing of software became
a reality, software manufacturers and vendors turned to copyright.
On the other hand, the Autonomy Phase was short from the perspective of those parties who sought to copy the software developed by
others. Apple first started marketing the Apple II around 1978.19 The
first lawsuit based on copyright infringement was brought in 1983.20
The original developers of this technology acted swiftly to discourage
others from copying their products. They understood that such activity,
if left unchecked, would set dangerous precedents and would cost them
economic gain. Thus, the Canadian software pirates had less than five
years in which they could act freely. This contrasts with the decades of
unchallenged practice that the original developers had.
Although the autonomy of the copiers was short-lived, it proved to
be lucrative. The U.S.-dominated computer industry entered Canada almost haphazardly. "Many U.S. companies have looked at Canada as a
minor additional market and the pirates have benefited" from this indifference. 2 1 In little time, the domestic copiers realized the potential
profit from copying. In addition, the low penalties involved with copyright infringement, coupled with the unsettled state of the law, provided great incentives for entrepreneurs to start copying software.
16. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 12.
17. Societe d'Informatique R.D.G., Inc. v. Dynabec Ltee., 6 C.P.R.3d 322, 6 C.I.P.R.
185 (Que. C.A. 1985).
18. Greguras, Protection of Computer Software in Canada (PartII), SOFrWARE PROTECTION, June-July 1983, at 2, 3.
19. Telephone interview with Bliss Simmons, Account Representative of Clinton
Computer Authorized Apple Dealership (Dec. 16, 1988).
20. Fisk, The Protection of Computer Software in Canada-The View As of September 1985, 2 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 176, 177 (1986) (referring to Orange Micro, Inc. v.
Spirales Computers, Inc., Fed. Ct. Co. T-2200-83 (1983)).
21. Littman, CanadianSoftware Stores Targets of Piracy Lawsuits Filed By IBM and

Apple, PC WEEK, Feb. 4, 1986, at 131, 138.
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"Canada, with its maximum penalty for copyright infringements limited
to $200 for a first offense, has become a haven for pirates." 22 Because
the outdated Copyright Act was ineffectual and with no precedent, the
entrepreneurs underpriced the "legitimate" software distributors,
thereby capturing customers and profit. 23 The software copiers were so
free that they were able to establish "software clubs", which provided
software at substantial discounts or offered software rental, which encouraged home copying.24 Perhaps the attitude of the copiers is best
summed up by an entrepreneur who said, "I don't consider myself a pirate. It is not illegal until the government or a judge rules it illegal."'25
The domestic copiers were only a part of the problem. The conflict
also involved a multitude of nations throughout the world. From the
industry's point of view, Canadian imports of software copies from nations with even more relaxed copyright laws were just as bad as copying. The nations that allowed copying included France, Spain, Portugal,
Italy, Mexico, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Argentina,
26
China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.
counthese
States
to
As soon as the technology spread from the United
tries, companies sprang up to take advantage of the situation. As in
Canada, the law was uncertain; indeed, some nations supported piracy
by fostering an atmosphere of government encouragement, if not outright cooperation. Economically, it was in these nations' short term best
interests to allow copiers to flourish, since this profitable operation
brought increased tax revenues to the exporting nation. 27 In Canada,
the foreign copycats cost the Canadian computer industry $400 million
annually. 28 Because a large bulk of this monetary drain went overseas,
it deprived Canada's economy of capital. But the impact of the drain
was felt ultimately by the U.S. firms who entered the Canadian market.
For example, in 1986 it was estimated that foreign copiers were costing
the U.S. computer and software industry $4.1 billion. 29 Thus, the impact in America was ten times that in Canada.
One important aspect of the Autonomy Phase is its length. The
22. Block, The Move Against Copycats, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 12, 1983, at 38.
23. Littman, supra note 21, at 138.
24. Id.; Keon, Computer Program and Semiconductor Chip Protection: Legislative
Progress in Canada, 3 CAN. INTELL. PRoP. REv. 230, 238 (1987) [hereinafter Legislative
Progress].
25. Block, supra note 22, at 38.
26. Betts, supra note 15, at 79; Churbuck, U.S. Software Firms Struggling to Stem Illegal Foreign Sales, PC WEEK, Nov. 11, 1986, at 213, 216.
27. Bangsberg, Asians Act to Tighten Copyright Protection, J. COMMERCE & COMMER
CIAL, June 23, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
28. Urquhart, Canada Passes Measure to Shield Software, Wall St. J., June 3, 1988, at
9, col. 6.
29. Betts, supra note 15, at 79.
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longer a technological developer can act unchallenged in a particular
field, the more a presumption of possession develops. As years go by,
the status quo accepts the technological innovator as a de facto possessor of the entire field. In other words, the longer a technological innovator can act unfettered, the stronger their position will be once a
conflict arises. Eventually custom, expectation, and economic patterns
will develop from prolonged and undisturbed activity. While these factors alone will not decide the technico legal revolution's outcome, they
do constitute an unquantifiable yet real advantage for the original developers. Where, as here, the activity has gone on for decades without
conflict, there is almost a presumption of ownership in favor of the original software programmers. Such a presumption presents a difficult obstacle for a challenger to overcome.
Because an Autonomy Phase has a larger impact over time, the autonomy of the original developers far outweighs the autonomy of their
challengers. Because the developers acted in their field for decades
without interference, a presumption arose in their favor. When conflict
occurred, the developers were aided by the presumption that they somehow "owned" everything they produced. Conversely, the alleged infringers were "wrong" to infringe this presumed ownership. This idea,
although rarely explicitly enunciated, served as the foundation for the
analysis of most Canadian courts when they addressed this issue. Thus,
the plaintiffs in these cases started out with a great advantage.
B. CONFLICT PHASE
The development of the silicon chip led to the widespread use of
personal computers. This subsequently led to a much larger and richer

library of software available to more people than ever before. Suddenly, the computer was no longer relegated to servicing large companies' mainframe computers. With the advent of personal computers
came the development of floppy disks, programmable ROM chips, and
other easily accessible forms of memory storage. The technology for
copying programs from one disk to another, or from one chip to an-

other, became as technologically accessible as copying records on a
home stereo system. Yet unlike cassette tapes, the resulting software
copy is as good as the original because the replicated information is

digital.
The economics of copying made software piracy virtually inevitable.

Obviously, it costs much less to copy a program than it does to develop
the same program and then market it. Thus, the fundamental economic
conflict was created; software copiers were selling copies of the original
product for a fraction of the cost. Small wonder then that the parties
trying to protect their claims of ownership began calling these entrepre-
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neurs "pirates." For the first time, the established computer industry
had competition from the outside.
The economic challenge first arose between the industrial sector
and the domestic copiers in Canada. As little time as it took Canadian
entrepreneurs to establish "software clubs" and other unlicensed distribution outlets, it took even less time for the established industries to
strike back.3 0 Both Apple and IBM instituted suits as soon as they
learned that their programs were being copied. These actions stifled
the domestic copiers, with respect to individual software titles. "[A]
court victory by Apple or IBM is no guarantee that the [sellers of illegitimate software] will stop selling the other hundreds of software title
in their stores."''s At the beginning of the conflict stage, the infringing
parties have the advantage that the law is unsettled. Pirates can continue their actions until the technico legal revolution is resolved. "They
only stop selling the software of the companies that go after them ....
Unless we [the U.S. software developers] go after them, they won't
32

stop."P

The Conflict Phase of this technico legal revolution involved the
search for legal theories by both sides. Since the software industry had
greater resources and more at stake, they developed the widest array of
legal attacks against the pirates. More often than not, the copiers and
importers of Far Eastern copies were merely put on the defensive and,
instead of asserting their own legal arguments, they simply responded
to the industrial arguments. Canadians on both sides of this issue, as
well as the government, were acutely aware of the foreign trade impact
that any resolution would have, especially with the United States. Canada imports most of its high-tech goods from the U.S., and these imports
33
are vital in keeping Canada at the forefront of technology.
1.

Legal Analysis Under Unamended CopyrightAct

The industries relied on a variety of legal theories to try to protect
their software, such as copyright, trade secret, and patent law. The
most important is copyright law, because it was the legal theory which
eventually gained acceptance. The Canadian Copyright Act remained
essentially unchanged since its passage in 1924. Under the Act, copyright protects "every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic
work" by giving the author rights with respect to that work.34 The
30.
31.
32.
33.
(1986).
34.

See, e.g., Churbuck, supra note 26, at 216.
Littman, supra note 21, at 138.
Id.
Bale, U.S.-Canada High Technology Trade Issues, 11 CANADA-U.S.
Can. Rev. Stat., ch. C-30 § 4(1).

L.J. 13, 15
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rights of a copyright holder include the sole right to produce or
reproduce the work or any substantial part of the work in any material
form; to publish the work; to produce or reproduce any translation of
the work; and in the case of literary works, to make any record, film or
other contrivance by means of which the work may be performed or delivered mechanically.3 5 A copyright in Canada lasts for the life of the
author, plus fifty years. 36
In order for a plaintiff to show that a copyright has been infringed,
that plaintiff must prove that the work was in fact copyrighted, that the
plaintiff owns the copyright, and that the defendant has somehow infringed the copyright.3 7 Once a plaintiff has met the requirements, the
following forms of relief are available: recovery of all infringing copies
of the work, any profits the defendant made from the sale of the infringing copies, any damages the plaintiff suffered as a result of the infringement, and damages limited to a maximum of $200.3s The low
limit on damage awards highlights one of the drawbacks in resorting to
copyright as a means of enforcing the industries' interests. A $200 cap
does not provide much of a deterrent effect, especially in light of the
potential profits from selling software copies.
To prove copyright exists at all, the plaintiff must prove that the
work in question falls within one of the categories of protected works
listed above (i.e., literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic works, or contrivances to reproduce sounds mechanically).3 9 In addition, the plaintiff
must prove that the work in question is "original," that the work is
fixed in a material form, and that authorship requirements are
satisfied. 4°
The plaintiff must find a category of protected works to apply to
the specific work in question. However, section 2 of the Act further defines a literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic work as "every original
production in the literary, scientific or artistic domain, whatever may be
the mode or form of its expression." 41 These categories are rather narrowly defined by the Act.42 Because the definition of "literary works"
is fairly broad, most advocates of copyright protection have tried to fit
software under this category. The argument stems from the language
of the Act. Software arguably consists of an "original production... in
35. Id.

§ 3(1)(a)-(e).

36. Id. § 5.
37. Sinnott, supra note 9, at 16.
38. Can. Rev. Stat., ch. C-30 §§ 20(4), 21, 25(1).
39. Id. § 4(1), (3).
40. Id. § 4(1); J. MANN, supra note 5, at 40.
41. Can. Rev. Stat., ch. C-30 § 2.
42. Id. Software designed to control video games might fall into these categories.
Video games often involve both visual displays and musical accompaniment.
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the scientific... domain, whatever may be the mode or form of expression."'43 Because the language is so broad, software may indeed fall
under the category of literary works.
After this primary obstacle is dealt with, the three remaining requirements for copyright protection are fairly simple to meet. First, in
order for a work to be "original," a plaintiff need only show that it was
not copied from someone else.44 In addition, the author need only show
that sufficient effort was expended to produce the work.4 5 The fixation
requirement is a reflection of the policy that copyright should protect
expression, but not ideas. 46 The industrial advocates argued that source
code is a work within the meaning of the Act and that, even if object
code is not, object code is a translation of source code and should thus
receive protection also.4 7 The final criterion, authorship, is easily satisfied. Any author is protected if they are either a British subject, reside
in "Her Majesty's Realms and Territories," or are citizens of a nation
that has agreed to the Berne Convention, an international agreement
on literary and artistic works.48 Additionally, an author will be protected by the Act if the author is from any nation that has entered into
a treaty or agreement with Canada and has promised to give Canadians
the same protection as its own citizens.49 During the Conflict Phase,
Canada and the United States were both adherents of the Universal
Copyright Convention. Thus, Canada protected American authors, even
though the U.S. was not a member of the Berne Convention. 50
A copyright infringement has occurred when the defendant has
done something only the owner of the copyright has the right to do
under the Act. 51 An author does not need to register copyrights with
the government, although if the copyrights are registered, the plaintiff
enjoys a procedural and evidentiary advantage. A registered copyright
held by a plaintiff provides evidence that copyright subsists in the work
in question and that the person registered is the actual owner of the
copyright. 52 While this is not conclusive evidence, it does shift the burden of proof more toward the defendant. Also, there is case law to sug43. Id.
44. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 40.

45. Levenberg, Copyright Law Protection of Computer Software in Canada, 1 CAN.
INTELL. PRop. REv. 69, 73 (1984).
46. Id.; Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815 (1855). This case established the principle of
expression versus idea in common law jurisdictions.
47. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 42.
48. Can. Rev. Stat., ch. C-30 § 4(1).
49. Id. § 4(2).
50. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 41.
51. Can. Rev. Stat., ch. C-30 § 17(1).
52. Id. § 36(2).
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gest that registration's benefits only accrue to items which are clearly
"works" as listed by the Act.
2.

MiscellaneousIndustrialArguments

In addition to copyright law, the software industry has used patent,
criminal, trade secret, licensing, and misappropriation law to fight
against unlicensed software copying.s 3 For example, in Canada it may
still be possible to use patent law to protect computer programs. Recent
decisions of the Patent Appeal Board have allowed this form of protection in certain cases.54 Because the law in Canada was so uncertain, it
was in the industries' best interests to attempt as many different approaches to protect software as possible. While each of these areas of
the law provided theoretically sound arguments, they all suffered from
drawbacks peculiar to each field.ss Moreover, these theories never
53. Patent protection for computer programs is generally unavailable in Canada. See
infra note 54.
Trade secret and licensing law had been used extensively by the industry. Trade secrecy law protects the underlying algorithms, as opposed to simply the expression of a
program. Moreover, the protlction lasts for as long as the secrecy is maintained and there
is no need for registration or 'application. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 115.
Misappropriation theories have also been asserted to protect software. A third party
may be enjoined from misappropriating information under an equitable theory of unjust
enrichment. Id at 135.
Finally, criminal law had been suggested as a means of protecting intellectual property interests. In light of recent rulings, it was possible that distribution of infringing copies of software may have constituted criminal fraud. See Regina v. Kirkwood, 42 O.R.2d 65
(C.A. 1983); Regina v. Stewart, 42 O.R.2d 225 (C.A. 1983). The advantages for proceeding
with the criminal law is that, since the prosecution would be carried out by the state, the
software developer carries none of the economic burden of pursuing the case. In addition,
criminal sanctions may provide greater deterrent for future infringers and there is no
statute of limitations for criminal fraud actions. The limit for actions brought under the
Copyright Act is three years. Can. Rev. Stat. § 24; Hitchcock, Intellectual Property Infringement as Criminal Fraud,1 CAN. INTELL. PRop. REv. 182, 183 (1984).
54. The Federal Court of Appeal, whose decisions are binding on the Patent Appeal
Board, found programs to be analogous to mere scientific principles or abstract theorems,
which are specifically disallowed patent protection by the Canadian Patent Act. Schlumberger Can. Ltd. v. Commr. of Patents, 56 C.P.R.2d 204 (Can. Ct. App.1981); Patent Act,
Can. Rev. Stat., ch. P-4, § 28(3) (1970). Because programs are not inventions, they are not
patentable standing alone. However, subsequent decisions of the Patent Appeal Board
have made clear that patents will issue if the program is derived from an inventive concept or the program is part of an improved process that serves a useful end result. See,
e.g., Re Application of Patent of International Business Machines Corp., 6 C.P.T.3d 99
(Pat. App. Bd. 1984) (now Patent No. 1,187,197). It may now be possible to describe Operating System programs as methods or strategies to achieve a particular result in such a
way as to make them patentable. Additionally, application programs may be patentable if
they are part of a larger system which does more than mere calculations. J. MANN, supra
note 5, at 151-52.
55. Patent protection, while desirable because it protects the underlying inventive
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made it beyond the Conflict Phase of this technico legal revolution. In
a certain sense, they each comprise a technico legal revolution in
themselves.
3.

Competing Legal Theories

The software copiers were much less innovative in developing legal
theories under which to defend their position. As a first response, they
automatically denied the appropriateness of applying any of the theories outlined above. Next, they argued that the marketplace should remain unregulated and that freedom of competition demanded that
software remain unrestrained.- 6 Another argument was that public access to software increases society's welfare and that impeding access to
innovative technology and its control should not be allowed. 57 Finally,
they argued that none of the existing forms of intellectual property
schemes are relevant to computers or software, and that new, sui
concept and not merely the form of expression, has drawbacks because the patent only
lasts for seventeen years. The patent prosecution process is also expensive in both time
and money.
Trade secret law is not particularly useful in a mass-marketing context. For the
holder of an alleged trade secret to obtain legal relief, the holder must have undertaken
reasonable steps to protect that secret, steps which are antithetical to the concept and
practice of mass marketing. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 126-27. The legal strength of a
trade secret complaint lies in the existence of an underlying confidential relationship.
Such relationships rarely exist between developers and users or copiers of software.
"Shrink-wrap" licenses have not been evaluated by the Canadian courts, but analogous cases indicate that the developers would be under considerable onus to prove they
took enough steps to bring the license provisions to their customers' notice. Id. at 335.
Misappropriation of trade secrets by third parties suffers from the same problem. It
will generally only be enforceable where there has been a breach of some confidential relationship resulting in information flowing to the third party from the breaching duty
holder. Id. at 134. Since this equitable theory is dependent on the surrounding circumstances, it cannot protect all software per se. Id. at 135.
There are several disadvantages to using the criminal justice system. First, the fraud
charge assumes that the software copies infringe the Copyright Act. This was not necessarily a valid assumption in 1984 when this theory was first asserted. Second, the piracy
victim will not receive damages, unless the court orders restitution. Hitchcock, supra note
53, at 183. Third, the burden of proof in criminal cases is much higher than in civil cases.
The burden is raised to "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id Finally, the Crown Attorney
(Canada's equivalent to a District Attorney) may exercise prosecutorial discretion and not
pursue the case at all or not as forcefully as the victim might wish. Id. at 189. This approach to software protection was not widely pursued because too much discretion was
left in the hands of a third party, the Crown Attorney. Additionally, while the deterrent
effect may be greater, this course of legal action did not create any positive rights in the
developers of the software.
56. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., 28 D.L.R.4th 178, 213 (Fed.
Ct. 1986).
57. Morgan, Notes of Cases, Copyright-ComputerPrograms-IsCopyright Protection
Desirable?,63 CAN. BAR REV. 412, 422-23 (1985).
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generis legislation is needed to create a better, more flexible, and more
equitable system for protecting software.~S This last legal theory was
the most persuasive and, since it conceded that some kind of protection
was needed, it was the most realistic proposal.
The most viable legal argument the software copiers made was the
suggestion that legislation be passed which would create a new legal
protection scheme for software. The details of this sui generis legislation were expounded in the Canadian government's White Paper on
Copyright Reform, issued in 1984. 59 The proposal distinguished between human-readable and machine-readable computer programs, between source code and object code. The White Paper would give
human-readable programs normal copyright protection for the life of
the author plus fifty years. On the other hand, machine-readable programs would only be protected for five years.6° This protection scheme,
modeled loosely on the U.S. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, would
allow dissemination of programs more quickly and, thus, would take
into account the relatively short life-span of software's value.6 ' This approach realizes that full copyright protection is inappropriate both from
a historical point of view, since copyright was first developed to protect
book printers, and from a practical point of view, since to offer full
copyright in software is to provide a monopoly for much more than the
valuable lifetime of any software. 62
Since most of the software copiers' other arguments were fairly
weak, this legislative proposal was the primary legal strategy that the
software copiers brought into the Determination Phase. Their other arguments, based on economic and social policy, fell aside as did the theories of patent, trade secret, misappropriation and criminal law that the
industrial advocates promoted. Consequently, entering the next phase,
the opposing parties brought their strongest theories to bear. Now it
was up to the legal system to begin sorting out the conflict in the Determination Phase.
58. Sinnott, supra note 9, at 45.
59. GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FROM GUTENBERG TO TELIDON: A GUIDE TO CANADA'S
COPYRIGHT REVISION PROPOSALS (Supply and Services Canada 1984) [hereinafter WHITE
PAPER].
60. Id. at 11. The term of protection for the machine-readable code could be modified, for example, to ten years instead of five, as long as the modification does not go beyond the seventeen years afforded by the Patent Act. Sinnott, supra note 10, at 45-46.
The exact numbers could be determined by consensus or negotiation, but the important
point is that the protection scheme should be flexible and realistic.
61. Levenberg, supra note 45, at 84 n.99.
62. Morgan, supra note 57, at 420-21.
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DETERMINATION PHASE

It was in the economic challengers' interests to drag out the Determination Phase as long as possible, since there was very little negative
pressure under existing law. In addition, the copiers had fewer resources with which to fight and were not as well organized as their industrial opponents. These handicaps, coupled with the presumptions in
favor of the original technological developers, led to a dim prognosis for
the challengers. Thus, the longer it took for the technico legal revolution to be resolved, the longer the copiers could profit.
1.

JudicialAction

The Determination Phase of this technico legal revolution witnessed the legal system's choice between two competing legal regimes:
Copyright Protection or sui generis protection tailored specifically for
the problems inherent in high technology. The entrenched industries
clamored for copyright protection for software, while commentators,
some government officials, and the economic challengers sought the legislative approach. A review of the jurisprudential development will indicate how the arguments brought by the various parties affected
judicial action.
The first cases involving software protection went largely unreported and dealt with plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions. Many
of the initial cases involved video games, where the plaintiff sought an
Anton Piller order, which would allow the plaintiff to seize infringing
copies.63 The earliest reported suit is Midway Mfg. Co. v. Amusement
Electronics Ltd. brought in 1981, in which the plaintiff successfully obtained an injunction." In most of these early cases, very few meaningful hearings were held and default judgments and settlements seemed
to govern the conduct of the suits.s6

The first video game case on the appellate level was Nintendo

America, Inc. v. Coinex Video Games, Inc.,66 in which the Federal
Court of Appeal overruled the trial court and allowed an Anton Piller
order to issue. Although the court did not explicitly address the issue of
whether copyright existed in the game program embedded in the chip,

63. Fisk, supra note 20, at 176-77. An "Anton Piller Order" is a court order similar to
an injunction by which a plaintiff, after persuading a court in an ex parte hearing, is allowed to enter a defendant's premises and seize evidence of copyright, patent, or trademark infringement. It preserves infringing articles which are easy to destroy. The order
is named after the case which originally allowed this type of seizures. J. MANN, supra
note 5, at 101-05.
64. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 101-05; Midway Mfg. Co. v Amusement Electronics Ltd.,
No. 4051/81 (Sup. Ct. Ont. 1981).
65. Fisk, supra note 20, at 177.
66. 69 C.P.R.2d 122 (Ct. App. 1982) (Crazy Kong infringing Donkey Kong).
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the decision seems to imply that the court believed copyright did exist,
since the injunction was allowed.67 The court believed a strong prima
facie case of copyright infringement had been presented.ss To reach
this conclusion, the court's underlying assumption must have been that
copyright existed in the first place.
These preliminary cases were almost all ex parte proceedings where
most of the plaintiffs were seeking Anton Piller orders to seize evidence
of infringement. Since these were ex parte proceedings, their value is
suspect because the economic challengers were never allowed to raise
their arguments until it was too late. This occurred in both the video
game cases and the early "true" software cases.
The first year copyright computer cases were launched in Canada
was 1983. As with the video game cases, these early hearings involved
injunctions. Two cases which were actually contested are Spacefile Ltd&
v. Smart Computing Systems Ltd 6 9 (Spacefile) and Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Computermat,Inc.70 (Computermat). Both cases dealt with applications for preliminary injunctions. In Spacefile, the court found
that "the source code and programmes [sic] . . . are original ideas expressed in a particular form." 71 The court continued: "They are the
proper subject matter of copyright.172 Although the Computermat
court discussed copyrightability of computer programs, it did not decide
the issue.73 Neither of these decisions dealt with the issues in depth.
Moreover, these decisions did not provide any definitive proclamations
of the law. Their importance lies primarily in their influence on later
courts which fully tackled this technico legal revolution.
The first case to deal squarely with this issue was International
Business Machines Corp. v. Spirales Computers, Inc.74 (IBM). The defendant was accused of selling Taiwanese computers which allegedly
contained chips encoded with illegal copies of IBM's BIOS Operating
System program. The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from infringing the copyright by selling the computers.75 In deciding whether the program was properly copyrightable, the court first
noted that cases like Spacefile were "of somewhat limited value. 76
Justice Reed rejected these cases because they focussed on slightly dif67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Fisk, supra note 20, at 176.
Id.
75 C.P.R.2d 281 (Ont. H.C. 1983).
75 C.P.&2d 26 (1983).
Spaceftie, 75 C.P.R.2d at 281.
IM
Computermat,75 C.P.R.2d at 31.
12 D.L.R.4th 351 (Fed. Ct. 1984).
Id at 353.
Id at 355.
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ferent issues.77

The IBM court instead relied heavily on cases from other common
law jurisdictions, especially decisions which dealt with this issue from
British Commonwealth Nations and the United States. The court set
the stage by deciding it would not interpret the Copyright Act narrowly. 78 Then, after refuting each contention by the defense, the court
simply concluded by finding for the plaintiff.79
In refuting the first argument raised by the defense, the court relied on a South African case which supported the position that source
code is a literary work.8 0 Next the court referred to a United States
Third Circuit case to support the contention that object code was also a
literary work.81 The court then excerpted extensively from an Australian intermediate appellate court case which held that a copyright subsisted in software even though programs do not "communicate"
anything to humans.8 2 Finally, the court rejected the argument that
only the program as written in the technical manual was reproduced in
material form. The court seemed to agree with the Australian case that
the code itself is in material form. "[IThe better view would seem to be
that the 'chip' version of the code is a reproduction in material form."8 3
The court concluded that the plaintiff presented a prima facie case of
copyright infringement.
The next two significant cases were both decided by provincial appellate courts. These decisions were only separated by a few months.
In F & I Retail Systems Ltd. v. Thermoguard Automotive Products Canada Ltd.,84 the Ontario High Court found that copyright exists in computer systems and issued an injunction. The Quebec Court of Appeal
affirmed the decision of the Quebec Superior Court reaching the same
conclusion in Societe d'informatique R.D.G., Inc. v. Dynabec Ltee.85 By
finding object code to be a translation of the source code, the Quebec
Superior Court departed slightly from prior Canadian decisions.8 6 Prior
decisions had found object code to be a reproduction of the source code
77. Id.
78. Id. at 356.
79. Id. at 361.
80. Id at 356-57; Northern Office Micro Computers v. Rosenstein, 1982 F.S.R. 124 (S.
Mr.).
81. IBM, 12 D.L.R.4th at 357; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
82. IBM, 12 D.L.R.4th at 359; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd., 53
A.L.R. 225 (Austl. Fed. Ct. 1984).
83. IBM, 12 D.L.R.4th at 361.
84. 1 C.P.R.3d 297 (Ont. H.C. 1984).
85. 6 C.P.R.3d 322 (Que. Ct. App. 1985), qffg 6 C.P.R.3d 299 (Que. Super. Ct. 1984).
86. Id.
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in a material form, not a translation.87 This prior interpretation was
not expressly overruled by the Quebec Court of Appeal, but the court
seemed to be more receptive to the notion that the object code was a
reproduction.8s This decision put Quebec firmly in line with the Federal Court and appeared to strengthen the burgeoning judicial move89
ment toward full copyright protection.
The first full trial on a computer program copyright was Apple v.
Mackintosh9° (Apple) and is probably the most comprehensive discussion of this issue by a Canadian court to date. Before the case came to
full trial, the plaintiff was denied an interlocutory injunction. 91 The
judge who denied the injunction agreed that both sides had presented
strong arguments, which were better left resolved after a full trial. The
motions court was unimpressed with the plaintiff's heavy reliance on
foreign jurisprudence. Also, the plaintiff failed to make a showing of
irreparable harm. Moreover, the plaintiff presented a weak prima facie
92
case. Thus, the motions court refused to issue the injunction.
At the time, this ruling caused some commentators to back away
from the view that full copyright protection was imminent, especially
since Canadian jurisprudence relied so heavily on case law from foreign
jurisdictions where the statutory system was different.93 However,
most commentators believed the full trial would establish copyright
protection. One commentator went so far as to predict that "the signs
are favourable [sic] for a decision confirming computer program copyright in Canada." 94 This was hardly an audacious prediction. The trend
in prior decisions was that "there have been no cases in Canada (or indeed anywhere in the common law world) which have decided, in the
highest court to which the matter was taken, that copyright did not ex''95
ist for computer programs.
The defendants in this case were accused of selling Apple computer
clones. Instead of copying the programs from one chip to another, they
used an EPROM "burner" to mechanically copy the Apple ROM chips
onto their EPROM chips.96 When the case was set for full trial, the de87. See, e.g., International Business Machines Corp. v. Spirales Computers, Inc., 12
D.L.R.4th 351 (Fed. Ct. 1984).
88. Societe dn'formatique,6 C.P.R.3d 299, 322 (Que. Ct. App. 1985).
89. Fisk, supra note 20, at 179.
90. 28 D.L.R. 4th 178 (Fed. Ct. 1986).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Freedman & Winters, Copyright Goes Computer: A Case Law Survey of Recent
Developments in Canada, 45 REVUE DU BARREAU 316, 324 (1985).

94. Fisk, supra note 20, at 179.
95. Id.(emphasis added).
96. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., 28 D.L.R.4th 178, 198-99
(Fed. Ct. 1986).
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fendants were unfortunate enough to get as the presiding Justice the
same Justice who had decided the IBM case, Justice Reed. In light of
her previous decision regarding computer copyright, her final decision
here should have come as no surprise.
After disposing of issues not in contention, the court addressed the
heart of the case. "The issue is whether a computer program which
originates as a written text ... continues to be covered by copyright
when it is converted into its electrical code version." 97 In tackling this
issue, the court addressed each of the defendants' arguments in turn.
As in IBM, after rejecting each of the defendants' arguments, the court
98
found for the plaintiff.
The first issue the court dealt with was the whether object code
was a translation of source code. The defendants argued that the object
code version of the program was not a translation of the source code but
a different literary work. 9 9 In rejecting this argument, the court simply
cited a dictionary definition of "translation" and in conclusory language
proclaimed that "[t]he conversion from one code to another clearly falls
within that definition."' 1
Justice Reed completely abandoned her arguments in favor of treating object code as a "reproduction in material
form" of source code which she developed at great length in IBM.10
Although she mentioned the "translation" argument in IBM, Justice
Reed opined that the "reproduction in material form" argument seems
10 2
to be "the better view."'
The court next dealt with the argument that copyright law cannot
protect the program since the program is embedded in a ROM chip.
The idea and expression have merged.'0 3 The court rejected this contention and cast doubt as to whether the "merger" doctrine even exists
in Canadian law.' ° 4 The court also noted that the defense conceded
that the source code version of the program was copyrightable. 0 5 Why
the defense made such a concession is not explained. If a computer program represents the merger between an idea and its expression, then it
should not matter whether that program is in source code or object
code. By making this concession, the defense effectively eliminated de97. Id at 197.
98. Id at 229.
/
99. Id. at 197.
100. Id. at 198.
101. International Business Machines Corp. v. Spirales Computers, Inc., 12 D.L.R.4th
351, 360-61 (Fed. Ct. 1986).
102. Id. at 361.
103. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., 28 D.L.R.4th 178, 198-99
(Fed. Ct. 1986).
104. Id,at 202, 204-05.
105. Id at 201-02.
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bate on this point. The court also noted that there are multiple ways in
1
which a program can be written and still produce the same result.

6

This fact would also seem to defeat the application of the merger
doctrine.
The defense's third argument was that the Copyright Act does not
cover the embodiment of the plaintiff's program in the ROM chip. The
language of the Act reads: "'copyright' means the sole right to produce
or reproduce the work ... in any material form whatever."''I 7 The argument was that the embodiment of the program is not a reproduction
of the work in a material form. Moreover, any reproduction must ultimately communicate the work to human beings.' 0 The court revived
the arguments from the IBM decision to address whether or not computer programs were "reproductions in material form."'I 9 Justice Reed
read the expansive language "in any material form whatever" to be
broad enough to include programs embedded in chips." 0 As to the
"communication" issue, the court believed that "the requirement of
'readability' or 'appearance to the eye' found in the jurisprudence requires no more than that there be a method by which the work in
which copyright is claimed and the work which is alleged to infringe
can be visually compared for the purpose of determining whether copying has occurred."' 1 11 Since programs can be "retrieved" from ROM, the
112
court reasoned that such a method exists.
The court's logic is contradictory with respect to Justice Reed's
prior decision. When addressing the defense's first argument, the court
went to great lengths to find that the program was a translation of the
source code. At that point, the court made no mention of the previous
IBM decision, in which "the better view" was to treat object code as a
"reproduction in material form.""13 This is probably due to the fact
that the plaintiff corporation was itself arguing that the object code was
a translation of the copyrightable hexadecimal source code. 1 4 Yet,
when the court reached this argument, the translation issue was completely ignored. Instead, the court revived essentially the same arguments as in IBM, and concluded that the program was a "reproduction
106. Id. at 202.
107. Can. Rev. Stat., ch. C-30, § 3(1).
108. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., 28 D.L.R.4th 178, 207-09
(Fed. Ct. 1986).
109. Id. at 207-08.
110. 1& at 210.
111. Id at 208.
112. Id. at 208.
113. Id. at 198; International Business Machines Corp. v. Spirales Computers, Inc., 12
D.L.R.4th 351, 361 (Fed. Ct. 1984).
114. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., 28 D.L.R.4th 178, 186 (Fed.
Ct. 1986).
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in a material form.""l 5 This conclusion appears to be inconsistent. A
computer program can be characterized as a "translation" of the source
code or as a "reproduction in material form" of the source code. But it
is incongruous for the object code to be both a translation and a reproduction at the same time. And yet, that is exactly what the court seems
to be saying. At best, this is mere sloppy jurisprudence. At worst, this
is an irreconcilable contradiction which reveals a clear judicial bias as to
how this technico legal revolution should be resolved.
The final argument posited by the defense consisted of four policy
reasons why copyright should not extend to software. The first policy
reason argued was that copyrighting software will grant a monopoly on
an item of commerce which is against public policy. The second policy
reason argued was that patent law, rather than copyright law, was the
appropriate legal regime to apply to protect software. The third policy
reason argued was that since Parliament was currently debating how to
amend the Copyright Act, the courts should not usurp Parliament's
function by extending the Act to software. Finally, the fourth policy
reason argued was that since there was so much uncertainty surrounding this issue, the defendants should not be penalized for acting in the
way they did. -1 6 The court rejected each of these arguments in turn.
First, the court agreed that copyright will grant a monopoly, but that is
the precise purpose of copyright. 117 Second, the court disagreed that
overlapping fields of law were to be avoided and did not believe that
courts need to frame their decisions to avoid such overlaps. 1 8 Third,
the court rejected examination of legislative debate over copyright reform, preferring to apply the law as currently written and leave the debate to the legislature. 119 Finally, the court stated that it is precisely
the role of courts to make decisions when the law is unclear, and that
ignorance or uncertainty of the law is not a valid defense. 120
After the court disposed of all the defendants' arguments, the court
proceeded to determine individual liability.' 21 The court even pierced
the corporate veil and found the directors and officers of one defendant
corporation personally liable. 122 The lengthy technical discourse and
the full treatment of all the defense arguments are evidence of the
court's strong desire to establish the state of law in this uncertain area.
115. Id at 210; Compare Apple, 28 D.L.R.4th at 206-212 with IBM, 12 D.L.R.4th at 36061 (discussing the translation issue).
116. Apple, 28 D.L.R.4th at 213.
117. Id.
118. Id at 214.
119. Id. at 214-15.
120. Id at 215.
121. I& at 218-30.
122. Id. at 222.
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The persuasiveness of both the Apple and IBM opinions were
sharply undermined when the Australian High Court, the highest court
in that nation, overruled the Australian case upon which Justice Reed
relied so heavily. a23 The same reasons Justice Reed gave for following
Australian cases now militates against her conclusions. If Australian jurisprudence was of "considerable persuasive value" in support of her position, then it must have the same force in standing against her ultimate
decision. Since the Canadian court found "[c]ases decided outside of
Canada, in Commonwealth countries having a copyright statute not too
dissimilar to our own ... [to be] more helpful in many ways" than Canadian jurisprudence, the continuing validity of both the IBM and Apple
decisions is questionable.' 4
While Apple was the fullest treatment of this issue, it was only a
federal trial court decision. However, in February 1987, a Notice of Appeal was filed. 125 In June 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed
126
the trial court.
2.

Competing Legal Regimes

The third and fourth policy arguments that the defendants made in
Apple were essentially appeals to the court to wait for the legislature to
adopt the kind of sui generis legislation that constitutes the other competing legal regime in this technico legal revolution. x27 While the Canadian judiciary appeared to be opposed to adopting such a legal regime
sua sponte, the economic challengers, through the legislature and commentators, waged a slightly more successful campaign outside the
courtrooms.
As far back as 1957, the Canadian government recognized a need to
revise the 1924 Copyright Act, since the Act had failed to keep abreast
of technical developments such as television.' s From 1957 to 1977, several committees and commissions were charged with evaluating copyright reform. They unanimously advised that computer programs not
be given copyright status.'2 9 It was not until the Determination Phase
123. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd., 65 A.L.R. 33 (H.C. Austl.
1986), rev'g Apple Computer, Inc. v. Computer Edge Pty. Ltd., 53 A.L.R. 225 (Fed. Ct.
Austl. 1984). The Australian government later passed legislation which effectively overruled this decision.
124. International Business Machines Corp. v. Spirales Computers, Inc., 12 D.L.R.4th
351, 355 (Fed. Ct. 1984).
125. Sinnott, supra note 9, at 2 n.5.
126. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., Doc. Nos. 20643, 20644
(S.C.C.) (June 21, 1990) (decision not yet reported).
127. Apple, 28 D.L.R.4th at 214-15.
128. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 109.
129. Id. at 110.
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of this technico legal revolution that government committees and departments began to seriously consider extending copyright protection to
software.
In 1983, the Task Force on Copyright Law Revision, under the auspices of the Department of Communication, issued its final report. 30
The Task Force recognized the uncertainty in this legal field, implicitly
acknowledging the existence of this technico legal revolution. The Task
Force specifically rejected creating a new legal regime tailored specifically for this field. On the contrary, the Task Force supported the position of the industries and advised full copyright protection for software,
3
regardless of the form of expression.' '
In 1984, the Canadian government issued a White Paper on Copyright reform, entitled "From Gutenberg to Telidon: A White Paper on
Copyright."' 32 This White Paper, written by both the Department of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs and the Department of Communications, made extensive recommendations and dealt explicitly with
software. The White Paper proposed a separate legal regime for
software and rejected full traditional copyright protection.l 33 The
White Paper authors divided software into two categories: programs in
"human readable form" and programs in "machine-readable form." A
"machine-readable" program was defined as a program that was not intended for human comprehension.' 34 Human-readable programs would
be given full copyright protection in accordance with Canada's international treaty obligations.l 35 Machine-readable programs would only be
given protection for five years and would not include a moral right, a
public performance right, a broadcast or cable transmission right, a
market segregation right, or a right to use the program.' 36 Finally, the
White Paper recommended mandatory markings for published programs.' 37 This special regime for machine-readable programs would not
include international protection.lss
Naturally, the computer industry and members of the legal community who represented the industry reviled this proposal. However, commentators, especially the academics who had no economic stake in this
technico legal revolution, supported the suggestion of a specialized legal
regime for software. Thus, for a while at least, it appeared that the eco130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id
Id.
Id.; WHrrE PAPER, supra note 59.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 59.
Id.; J. MANN, supra note 5, at 111.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 59, at 11.
J. MANN, supra note 5, at 111.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 59, at 11.
J. MANN, supra note 5, at 111.
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nomic challengers to the software industry might prevail in this
technico legal revolution. There were a number of arguments raised in
support of this sui generis protection system. First, since programs are
economic in nature, and not aesthetic, the new legislation should strike
a balance between rewarding the technological innovator and disseminating technical information for the public good.139 Full copyright is
not desirable because it "would be used as one more device to prevent
rather than enable, access to innovative programs- one more device of
industrial security."'140 "mhe White Paper proposal for sui generis protection for object code programs would seem to be more appropriate
than the traditional copyright protection ....
[It remains doubtful
whether traditional copyright protection, with its lengthy term of protection, is a suitable form of protection for what can be characterized as
being primarily utilitarian objects."'141 Finally, "the public's justification for copyright... is not to serve a private financial interest of one
group or another. It is to serve . . . [the] public interest. It is only to
that extent that copyright is justified."'142 As with most arguments in
the legislative arena, these tended to stress policy implications.
Thus, two battles in the same war were being waged. The industrial advocates were prevailing in the Canadian courts and were gaining
the protection they wanted. On the other hand, the economic challengers concentrated their efforts in the legislature and promoted revamping the law itself.
3. PoliticalArguments and False Analogies
The IBM court raised a number of political arguments. "It is well
known that the process of writing computer programmes [sic] is highly
creative and individualistic ....
It would, therefore, be extraordinary
and highly improbable, to find that two programmers not working together . .. had written programmes [sic] to accomplish anything more
than the simplest result in the same . . . way."'1 43 While this may be
true for some programs, it certainly is not true for all computer programs. Indeed, "programmes [sic] that can be effectively expressed (i.e.,
written or coded) in only one way should not be copyrightable,"' 144 since
139. Rush, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Software and Semiconductor Chips in
Canada-A CanadianPerspective, 33 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 162, 170 (1986).
140. Morgan, supra note 57, at 423 (Commissioner Hersey's dissent).
141. Sinnott, supra note 9, at 45, 48.
142. Panel on the White Paperon Copyright Law Reform, 1 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV.
420, 436 (1984) (remarks of Bruce McDonald) [hereinafter Panel on White Paper].
143. International Business Machines Corp. v. Spirales Computers, Inc., 12 D.L.R4th
351, 354 (Fed. Ct. 1984).
144. Wiggs, Canadian Co-pyright Protectionfor Computer Software--Recent Developments, 1 INTEL. PROP. J. 137, 143 (1984).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. X

"the merger rule may have application in the case of relatively short or
trivial programs."'145 If courts willingly provide full copyright protection to all computer programs in the belief that there is always a high
degree of creativity involved, then the result could be that "a software
proprietor could obtain something tantamount to patent protection enabling him to deprive computer owners of a functional capability of
their machines, but without being subject to the novelty examination
process and other safeguards that precede the grant of a patent."'14
In Apple, the court noted that the "possibility of two programmers
creating identical programs, without copying was compared by the defendants' expert witness to the likelihood of a monkey sitting at a typewriter producing Shakespeare."'1 47 "The plaintiffs' evidence focused on
the operation of a computer from a programmer's point of view. The
plaintiffs' expert witnesses, except for one, were all software experts
... [who] described the computer in terms of its function of processing
and storing information." 14s "The defendants' expert evidence, on the
other hand, focused on the operation of a computer from a hardware
point of view... [and] focused on the functioning of the machine as a
complex system of integrated electrical circuits."'1 49 In their attempt to
rebut the defense, the plaintiffs presented an expert, but the court
"found it almost incredulous that the plaintiffs' 'hardware' expert refused to express himself except in software terms."1
Finally, the
court was not convinced by a "table of abstractions" used by the plaintiffs to bolster the proposition that "it was inappropriate to talk of pro151
grams and circuitry or voltage levels in the same sentence.'
Both sides, again, resorted to a number of political arguments in
the debate surrounding the sui generis legislation. The authors of the
White Paper claimed that "full traditional copyright protection might
impede technological progress and ignore certain realities of commerce
and industry."' 5 2 Another commentator argued that "a large difference
between the cost of producing a work initially and the cost of copying it
is not alone sufficient to show that copyright protection is desirable."
Turning the economic argument around against the industry, the argument concludes, "[b]ut evidence is still lacking of any substantial hardship suffered by software manufacturers which is directly related to the
145. Sinnott, supr note 9, at 32.
146. Wiggs, supra note 144, at 143.
147. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., 28 D.L.R.4th 178, 184 (Fed.
Ct. 1986) (emphasis in original).

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 191.
Id. at 191-92.

Id.
Id. at 227.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 59, at 11.
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hitherto absence of copyright protection."'153 Finally, there is a policyderived argument relating to the international aspects of technology
transfer. "Canada is a net importer of copyrighted materials and technology. Therefore, strengthened copyright protection for computer programs would result in substantial royalties flowing to persons outside
Canada." 154 This economic argument barely disguises the underlying
protectionist and nationalistic sentiment.
On the other side, the advocates of industrial concerns wrote that
"[t]o date there has been no problem with copyright being used as a
sword to stifle competition."'51 A colleague of that same author, working for the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, wrote that
the United States, which was the first nation to adopt full copyright
protection, has seen innovation and progress within their industry, the
world's largest and most competitive. The progress "has not been constrained by copyright protection. All available evidence suggests that
these healthy economic trends, including increasingly competitive pricing behavior, will continue with firms increasingly relying on the copyright in the software to license and exploit it in the marketplace."'' 5
"[N]o deleterious economic results can be traced to the granting of full
explicit copyright protection. Indeed, certainty resulting from clear
statutory guidance appears to have contributed to both international
15 7
and domestic trade in these products."'
In IBM, the court stated: "[it is perhaps not doing too much conceptual violence to think of [a program embedded on a ROM chip] as
analogous to a cassette tape in a tape recorder."'I5 With all due respect,
this certainly does do too much conceptual violence. This is a false analogy, because computer users do not slip chips in and out of their computers every time they use them. Although chips are replaceable, the
normal user does not replace them with any frequency approaching that
of a cassette player. The same court was unpersuaded in thinking of
the embedded program as being part of the machine. "An analogy in
my view would be to the role of a cassette tape in a tape recorder. Information is recorded on a tape in a fashion analogous to information
being embedded in the chip-both operate in conjunction with the respective machines for which they are designed but are not part of the
153. Morgan, supra note 57, at 421, 422.
154. Rush, supra note 139, at 169-170.
155. Knopf, Computer Program and Semiconductor Chip Protection: Canadian Government Options, 2 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 187, 190 (1986).
156. Keon, Intellectual Property Protection in Canada." The Technology Challenge, 11
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 27, 34-5 (1986) [hereinafter Intellectual Property].
157. Legislative Progress,supra note 24, at 233.
158. International Business Machines Corp. v. Spirales Computers, Inc., 12 D.L.FL4th
351, 354 (Fed. Ct. 1984).
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machine."' 59 Again, this analogy falsely assumes that chips are somehow easily replaceable, whereas in reality access to the interior of computers is recommended for qualified repairmen only. 160
The Apple court also addressed a number of false analogies. First,
the defense in Apple tried to characterize programs as "merely specifications for a machine part.' 161 Not all programs are mechanically embedded onto a chip.
Second, the court rejected the defense's analogy to recipes and recipe books. "While copyright would not prevent someone from making
Mrs. Beeton's rabbit pie . . . it does prevent someone copying the [recipe] book itself."'162 The defense tried to characterize their actions as
analogous to "following the recipe" in the ROM chip. The court
changed the analogy from "following" the recipe to "copying" the recipe
book. The analogy in both cases is false since the instructions in ROM
are intended to control the Operating System of a machine, whereas a
recipe in a book is intended for human comprehension.
Third, the defense tried to analogize programs to mathematical formulas, which are not copyrightable. The court believed that a program
is more like a textbook on mathematics. 163 The analogy is false because
mathematical formulas are not used to control mechanical processes.
The programs are not mathematical formulas but are more like logical
formulas.
One final analogy tried to compare the computer industry to the
pharmaceutical industry. "The pharmaceutical industry invests a substantial amount of capital in research and development ....
Patent
protection, which has public disclosure benefits, is sufficient to enable
the industry to recoup its costs-with handsome profit--even though its
output can be copied at little cost."' 16 4 Again, this is a false analogy because it presupposes that patent protection would be completely available for all software.
D. RESOLUTION PHASE
At the outset of the Resolution Phase, the advocates of full copyright protection had captured the approval of the Canadian courts. The
primary battle was now in the legislature. Although the advocates of a
159. Id. at 358.
160. For example, the rear warning panel on this author's Apple MacPlus personal
computer clearly reads in bold print: "To prevent electrical shock, do not remove cover.
No user serviceable parts inside. Refer serving to qualified servicing personnel."
161. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd., 28 D.L.R.4th 178, 192 (Fed.
Ct. 1986).
162. Id. at 203.
163. I& at 214.
164. Morgan, supra note 57, at 422.
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sui generis protection scheme gained the advantage with the issuance of
the White Paper, their opponents had already aligned arguments and
forces to counter this legislative development. Outside political forces
played the largest role in shaping the ultimate resolution of this
technico legal revolution in the Resolution Phase.
1.

Shifting the Burden of Proof

As outlined above, the courts up to this point had almost unanimously found in favor of the advocates of full copyright protection. One
salient aspect of a technico legal revolution is that during the Resolution Phase, the legal system assigns the burden of proof to the party
that ultimately loses. This certainly happened in Canada. In both IBM
and Apple, Justice Reed attacked the issue with roughly the same logical pattern. She addressed each of the defendants arguments in order,
rejected all of them, and found for the plaintiffs. The underlying assumption, therefore, must have been that copyright already existed in
the software. It was the defendants' burden to prove that copyright did
not exist in the computer programs. This is contrary to the normal burden of proof in copyright cases. Cuisenaire v. South West Imports
makes it clear that the presumption of copyright provided by registration of copyright is only available for "works" which are clearly within
the categories of "works" as listed in § 4(1) of the Copyright Act.1ss
Although the plaintiffs registered their copyrights, they should not
have been granted the presumption of copyright. Instead, it should
have been incumbent on the software manufacturers to prove that copyright existed in their programs. "Thus, the Court seems to have proceeded upon the wrong footing that the defendants had to rebut a
presumption that copyright subsisted in such object code programs." 1 6
The case law affected how the final battle was fought in the legislature. The courts had shifted the burden of proof to the defendant economic challengers. By giving the original technical developers a
presumption of copyright, the legal system had fulfilled the expectations which arose during the decades-long Autonomy Phase of the entrenched industries. Since the courts had granted this presumption, the
industries were not going to allow the legislature to take it away.
2. Legislative Action
The White Paper was panned after it was issued. "The proposals in
the White Paper... were widely criticized by legal writers and representatives of the computer industry. Most of the objections . . .indi165. Cuisenaire v. South West Imports, 37 Fox Pat. C. 93, 109 (Fed. Ct. 1967), appeal
dismissed, 40 Fox Pat. C. 81 (Can. 1968).
166. Sinnott, supra note 9, at 18.
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cated that the proposed distinction between human-readable and
machine-readable programs was impracticable and unworkable."' 7
Even a government spokesman was forced to admit that the response
was disappointing.I '8 One argument was that "[a]ny attempt to separate
the protection afforded to source and object code soon leaves the author/programmer with only protection for the form of the work which
has no value in itself. Clearly, the source code form of the program is
of little interest to anyone because it cannot be used without conversion
first to machine-readable code on a machine-readable media."'169 Because the government sought general reactions and opinions about the
White Paper, only those parties with an economic interest, and which
were organized, took an active role. The net result was that they only
heard from industry spokespersons. So, naturally "[r]eaction to the
White Paper proposals to distinguish between the human readable and
machine readable phases of programs was . . . almost unanimously
0
negative."17
In the same year that the White Paper was issued, the Canadian
elections brought to power Brian Mulroney's Conservative Government.
At the time, there was some doubt as to whether the new government
would accept the previous government's report. "[W]e understand that
the White Paper is not a policy position of the present Conservative
Government, and they should not be expected to defend it. ' ' 171 After
the election, the Mulroney government referred the whole issue to a
special Parliamentary Subcommittee on the Revision of Copyright.
This subcommittee held hearings during 1985. The Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs stated in his appearance before the subcommittee that "the White Paper did not represent the policy of the
Canadian Government."'172 Thus, due to a shift in political fortunes, the
proponents of sui generis protection began losing their struggle.
After hearing extensive testimony from industrial representatives
and practitioners, the Subcommittee issued its report, A Charter of
Rights for Creators.173 Essentially, the Charter rejected the sui generis
approach recommended by the White Paper. Instead, the Charter advised giving full traditional copyright protection to software. "[T]he
Sub-Committee report goes a long way to correct the many major defi167. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 111-12.
168. Panel on White Paper,supra note 142, at 422 (remarks of Frank Keyes, Director
of Copyright).
169. Id. at 429 (remarks of Casey August of IBM, Toronto).
170. Intellectual Property, supra note 156, at 34.
171. Panel on White Paper,supra note 142, at 436 (remarks of Richard Hahn).
172. J. MANN, supra note 5, at 112.
173. SUBCOMMIrrrEE ON THE REVISION OF COPYRIGHT, STANDING COMMITTEE ON COM-

MUNICATIONS AND CULTURE, A CHARTER OF RIGHTS FOR CREATORS, (Can. Gov't 1985).
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ciencies contained in the White Paper in relation to computer programs,
thanks in great part to the many comments made by computer manufacturers and software producers during the public consultation process."'1 74 The next year the government issued a response to the
Charter. With few variations, the Response agreed with the recommen175
dations made by the Subcommittee.
In May of 1987, the Federal Government finally introduced Bill C60,176 the first phase of copyright reform. Bill C-60 protects computer
software as one of the category of works defined as "literary works."
The Bill further defined "computer programs" to be "any set of instructions that is expressed, fixed, embodied or stored in any manner and
that can be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a specific result. 1 77 Thus, the bill provides full copyright protection for software.178 Given the broad language, "stored in any manner,"
it may be that programs embedded in ROM are covered, although the
government announced that semiconductor mask works would be cov17 9
ered in the phase 2 amendments to the Act.
The Bill suffered some criticism and stalling in the Senate. "What
can one say about the present Bill C-60 which is incomplete, unfinished,
imperfect, piecemeal, and will probably be changed in many respects
shortly."' s The Liberal-controlled Senate blocked passage of the bill
for political reasons.' 8 ' The government was forced to make a few concessions unrelated to software and passage of the bill was delayed until
1988.182 On June 8, 1988, the bill received Royal Assent and became
law.1ss
The new law has not been tested in the courts, but its impact is expected to be strong. The law was not substantially changed from the
original draft of the bill. Computer programs are still defined as "liter174. Racicot, Copyright Reform in Canada as it Relates to Computer Programs,
SOFTWARE PROTECTION, Feb. 1986, at 6 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Co-pyright Reform].
175. DEP'T OF COMM., GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON THE REVISION OF COPYRIGHT (Can. Gov't Feb. 1986).

176. Bill C-60 § 1(2), (3), reprinted in SOFTWARE PROTECTION, Oct. 1987, at 9-10 [hereinafter Bill C-60].
177. Id. at 9.
178. Id.
179. Racicot, Copyright Reform in Canada-PhaseI Legislation, SOFTWARE PROTECTION, Oct. 1987, at 4.
180. Gray, Copyright Law Reform, 4 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 396 (1988).
181. LaPointe, Copyright Reform Stalls in Liberal Senate, BILLBOARD, Apr. 16, 1988, at
62, col. 2.
182. Green, CanadaAt Long Last Is Replacing Copyright Act Around Since 1924, VARI.
ETY,June 15, 1988, at 31.
183. Szibbo, Copyright Reform in Canada"Phase One, SOFTWARE PROTECTION, Aug.
1988, at 1.
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ary works," and are protected in any form or medium. Most importantly, the penalties were dramatically increased, with the Canadian
equivalent of a misdemeanor conviction carrying a fine of $25,000 or six
months imprisonment and with felony-equivalent convictions carrying a
$1,000,000 penalty or five years imprisonment.18 4 "While the changes
were not numerous, with respect to computer software, they appear to
be far-reachin."'l
The judicial decisions in the Determination Phase of this technico
legal revolution guided the legislature. The government effectively decided "to entrench the decision of [Apple]. It is clear that computer programs either in source code or object code, whether such programs are
application programs or operating programs, whether such programs
are stored in read only memory-ROM chips or magnetic tapes will be
protected."' 6 At this stage there never was a serious challenge as to
whether copyright should exist at all. The debate, by the time it got to
Parliament, was over the scope of the copyright. Since courts had already said the protection should be complete, it was simpler for the legislators to follow suit. The legislation actually goes farther than any of
the case law and is a resounding triumph for the industry.
E.

AFTER THE REVOLUTION

This Canadian technico legal revolution went through the four
phases: Autonomy, Conflict, Determination and Resolution. The resolution came when the courts converted the presumption in favor of the
technological developers into a burden of proving non-existence of copyright by the economic challengers. The challengers' fatal flaw was allowing the arguments to center around copyright law. By arguing in
terms of copyright, the economic challengers abandoned their legal theory. When the legislature completed its copyright reforms, the industries had the complete protection they advocated for at the conflict
phase. The overall effect was to restore the status quo that had built up
over decades. The government appears to have very little trouble accepting a technological monopoly.
Domestically, the new law will almost certainly encourage greater
prosecutions, more lawsuits, and more work for lawyers. Because the
Copyright Act is broad, even going so far as to include object code embedded in chips, it will spur domestic software production, but it will
also hurt the largest and most neglected party, the Canadian consumer.
The changes "mean royalty payments and higher prices to consumers
184. Bill C-60, supra note 176, § 25.
185. Szibbo, supra note 183, at 2.
186. Gray, supra note 180, at 397.
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view, they would be unfair measures for consumers."' 8 7 The
impact on consumers was never a major argument in deciding the outcome of this technico legal revolution.
Canada is at the cutting edge of this issue by giving full copyright
protection, and possibly patent protection, to software. The election of
the pro-industry Conservative Governmentss was a great boost for the
U.S.-dominated market participants. The Conservative Government
was extremely concerned about the Free Trade Agreement with the
United States. 8 9 The Mulroney government's free enterprise spirit' 90
spurred the revision of laws concerning investment and trade.' 9 ' Canada was "open for business."' 92
The new Copyright Act extends the definition of "literary works"
far beyond their original parameters. "It is interesting how far we have
come from the traditional concept of copyright .... We now define a
particular type of copyrightable subject matter as something which is
designed to bring about a certain result, i.e., that has a utilitarian function rather than one to be appreciated for its own sake.' 93 "Are the
'tentacles of copyright' tightening their grasp upon freedom of competition in utilitarian articles of commerce?"'' 94
If copyright is indeed stifling competition, it will have undesirable
long term effects on software development. As competition decreases,
stagnation and technological complacency will impede the future progress of scientific and economic development. Only the future will tell
whether Canada chose the proper method of software protection. However, because Canada is not the only nation in this world, this Article
will now turn to the international perspectives of copyright protection
for software.' 95
First, the status of software protection in the rest of the world will
be examined. Next, the international trade impact of such protection
...inour

187. Hall, Consumers and Creators,CAN. CONSUMER, Oct. 1987, at 50.
188. Copyright Reform, supra note 174, at 2.
189. See Hayhurst, Differences Between United States and Canadian Intellectual
Property Laws-Real and Apparent, 11 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 91, 132-34 (1986) [hereinafter
Dtfferences].
190. Evans, Canada For Sale: The Investment Canada Act, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L.,
June 1987, at 85.
191. Id. at 87.
192. Id. at 97.
193. Szibbo, supra note 183, at 2.
194. Fisk, supra note 20, at 178.
195. This Technico-Legal Revolution is international in scope. The different resolutions each nation fashioned underscores that there is no uniquely correct resolution. A
resolution can depend as much on politics as on legal analysis. See generally Brannigan &
Dayhoff, supra note 2 (political arguments are used as much as objective arguments,
based on scientific facts).
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will be discussed. This discussion will show that Canada provides an adequate case study of the world-wide technico legal revolution of
software protection.
IV.

BEYOND CANADA: SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN OTHER
NATIONS

Software can be copied easily from disk to disk.196 Therefore, the
potential for nations to learn how to copy and market counterfeit
software may become a problem in international software trade. 197 Because software technology is readily transportable, the problems associated with software protection are shared by technology-exporting
nations worldwide. i9 8 The technico legal revolution that Canada underwent is mirrored in almost every industrialized nation. Thus, the protection available in any one nation must be viewed in the larger
international context. "International protection in this context is highly
dependent on reciprocal and coordinated legal constraints."'1
Copyright is a statutory right and is governed by each jurisdiction
in a different manner. Although there are international conventions
which cover copyright, most notably the Berne Convention and the Uniform Copyright Convention, they are not universally adopted and have
little enforcement capability. Thus, differences between jurisdictional
treatment will ultimately only be resolved through international political negotiations, which require diplomats and governments to champion the cause of their domestic industries. As technology-based
industries gain ever increasing importance in the world economy, governments will, in turn, become more willing to address the issues of
concern to these industries.
Because high-technology and technological development are becoming vital for continued economic success, it is important to survey the
differences and similarities between protection schemes that these governments offer for software. Although the trend may be toward granting copyright protection, nations differ on the scope of protection. First,
a caveat is in order. Although this overview is comprehensive in
breadth, in-depth analysis of every nation's copyright law is beyond the
scope of this Article.
196. Note, Copyrightability of Object Code and ROM in Japan,Australia, and Germany. Surpassing TraditionalCopyright Limits, 6 COMPuTER/L.J. 513, 514 (1986).
197. Correa, Computer Software Protection in Developing Countries: A Normative
Outlook, 22 J. WoRLD TRADE L. 23, 24 (1988).
198. Nimmer & Krauthaus, Classificationof Computer Software for Legal Protection:
InternationalPerspectives, 21 INT'L LAw. 733 (1987).
199. Id. at 733.
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A.

UNITED STATES

In 1980, the U.S. amended its copyright laws specifically to include
computer software. 2 0 This was in response to pressure by the powerful
computer industry lobby. The industry was expected to achieve total
sales of $ 33.8 billion by 1985.201 Since the U.S. has the largest software
industry in the world,20 2 it is no surprise that the U.S. was the first to
address this issue. After the Copyright Amendment, computer industry
advocates have been able to press the courts to expand the scope of
software protection by launching lawsuits involving second-generation
3
computer issues, such as the look and feel debate20
The United States underwent the technico legal revolution much
like Canada did. As in Canada, the Copyright Act of 190920 4 was an outdated law which did not mention computers. There was talk of copyright protection for software in Congress since 1964. 205 In 1974, Congress established a commission, the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU"), which studied
the issue and made recommendations for amending the law. In 1978,
CONTU delivered its final report to Congress.2 ° 6 The report urged
20 7
Congress to grant comprehensive protection to computer programs.
In amending the Copyright Act, Congress adopted the commission's rec208
ommendations almost verbatim.
Under current U.S. law, computer programs are defined as a "set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."2° 9 Programs are then included in the category or list of items which are copyrightable. 210 The
Copyright Act allows for an archival copy to be made, although
200. See Computer Software/Software Copyright Act of 1980, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1986).
201. Altman, Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 5 COMPUTER/L.J. 413, 416
n.10 (1985).
202. Correa, supra note 197, at 23.
203. See Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1986) (computer screen's displays protectable under copyright); Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (copyright infringed where second pro-

gram had similar structure and organization as original but no slavish line-for-line copying involved).
204. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17

U.S.C. §§ 101-810, effective Jan. 1, 1978).
205. Altman, supra note 201, at 423.
206. See National Comm'n On New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final
Report (1978) [hereinafter CONTU].

207.
208.
209.
210.

Id
See Altman, supra note 201, at 423-25.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1986).
See id § 117.
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software developers are opposed to this. 21 ' Having won the first battle,
software advocates are now pressing the courts for further protection.
An example of the second-generation issue comes in Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison Word, Inc. which involved whether computer
screen displays were protected under copyright.212 A third-generation
issue is "shrink-wrap" licensing. Software manufacturers want to limit
how ultimate consumers may utilize a product by attempting to enforce
unilateral licensing agreements against the users. The copyright holders want to extend their protection by incorporating 2a3 control over the
"use" of their products, much like patent protection. '
The ultimate resolution helped the U.S. industry. Now the industry could point to the U.S. as a model for the rest of the world to follow.
By gaining full copyright protection in the largest software market in
the world, the industry had a powerful argument to persuade other governments to adopt similar protection. The industry also gained the support of the U.S. government in pressing other nations to adopt
reciprocal protection. Piracy weakened U.S. exports and lowered the
amount of foreign exchange entering this country.

2 14

The Canadian government looked to U.S. law as a model for revision. Canada still has the possibility of using patent law to protect
software. In this sense, Canada is even more protectionist than the
U.S., since the U.S. does not allow patent protection for software. 215 Internationally, Canada is at the forefront of this issue. The Canadian
protections will lead to increased international esteem, goodwill, and cooperation, especially with the U.S. On the other hand, the new law will
have a negative impact on relations with nations that are notorious for
promoting software copying. Since the U.S. is Canada's largest trading
partner, however, this is a minor concern.
B.

EUROPE

The European Community ("E.C.") has generally adopted copyright
protection for software. However, there are differences among the European Nations which stem from the fact that there are both common
law and civil law jurisdictions involved. Other differences arise from
211. See Altman, supra note 201, at 424-25.
212. 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
213. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987) (Louisiana's "shrink-wrap" license law ruled pre-empted by Copyright Act and relief denied on
all grounds).
214. Dam, The Growing Importance of InternationalProtection of Intellectual property, 21 INT'L LAW. 627, 628 (1987). It is estimated that American businesses, which market products dependent on copyright protection, lose about six to eight billion dollars per
year to counterfeiters.
215. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 198, at 743.
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the different traditions and histories associated with each member nation's copyright laws. In addition, there are differences in traditional focus on copyright. Continental states tend to view copyright more as a
moral right, stemming from the notion of "droit d'auteur," while other
states view copyright as simply an economic right, based on the right to
2 16
profit from what one creates.
The E.C. has attempted to harmonize its copyright laws. First, the
European Court of Justice decided, in a series of cases, that copyright
law fell within the scope of the Treaty of Rome and that copyright
rights could be exhausted. The court treated copyright as a form of industrial and commercial property. 217 In 1974, the European Parliament
suggested that copyright law should be harmonized. 218 As a result, the
European Commission issued a preliminary report and ordered a more
comprehensive report which followed in 1976.219 The Commission has
continued studying and working, albeit slowly, toward copyright
22 °
harmonization.
Although there are twelve members of the E.C., 22 not all the
members have well-developed software industries. Therefore, this Article will discuss the laws of the United Kingdom, West Germany and
France more comprehensively than the laws of the other European
nations.
1.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom Copyright Act of 1956 had been revised numerous times to resolve particular issues, but was never the subject of a
complete overhaul, as was the case in the United States and Canada.
One of the specific issues that the British government resolved was the
software protection problem. Software in the United Kingdom is now
22 2
explicitly protected by the Copyright Act.
The amendment to the Copyright Act was preceded by speculation
216. Vaver, Copyright in Foreign Works: Canada's InternationalObligations,66 CAN.
B. REv. 76, 82-83 (1987). The European/Continental notion of copyright rests on two pillars: economic and moral rights. In contrast, the Anglo-American notion of copyright is
primarily market oriented.
217. See McKeough, Intellectual Properto Protection and Freedom of Competition, 1
INTELL. PROP. J. 237, 247-59 (1985) (analyzing several cases and the European Court of
Justice's treatment of copyright issues which conflict with the Treaty of Rome).
218. Id. at 268.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 268-69.
221. The member states are: Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal and Spain. J.
BARTON & R. FIsHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVEsTMENT 171 (1986).

222. Cheyne, Copyright Reform in the United Kingdom, 3 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV.
405 (1987).
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as to whether the unrevised laws protected software. In 1977, the Whitford Committee, charged with studying copyright reform, believed that
software was protected. 223 Commentators in the legal press generally
agreed with the Whitford Paper. 224 As in Canada, a number of initial
cases dealing with the issue found that copyright existed in software
programs.=
By the time the reform bill was introduced into the House of Commons, the consensus was to extend copyright to software. The amendment received support from all the political parties and sped through its
Committee stage in the House of Commons in seven seconds.2 2 The
Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act became law in July,
1985.2 v
The amendment stipulated that "[t]he Copyright Act 1956 shall apply in relation to a computer program.12 28 The amendment, however,
declined to define what a computer program is "because 'everyone
knows what one is,' although no case has put forward a definition!" 229
The amendment, sponsored by the Federation Against Software Theft,
an industry advocate, brought software within the ambit of copyright
law. 230 Thus, the industry's goals and desires for protection were
achieved in the United Kingdom, as they were in the U.S. and Canada.
Currently, the British government is in the process of conducting a
comprehensive overhaul of its entire copyright structure. 23 ' A recent
Government White Paper did not recommend any drastic changes in
protecting software. However, it did make one clarification. The White
Paper recommends extending copyright to works which are "fixed in
any form from which it can in principle be reproduced.1 23 2 This would
affirm the copyrightability of object code in Britain. The White Paper
maintains the position that defining computer software is
23 3
unwarranted.
In three major common law jurisdictions, Canada, the U.S., and the
United Kingdom, the norm is to provide copyright protection to
software. All three jurisdictions underwent similar reform patterns:
223. Smith, The Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act 1985, 46 CoMPUTERs
AND LAW 9 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter CoMPUTERs AND LAW]; Correa, supra note 197, at 25.
224. COMPUTERS AND LAW, supra note 223, at 9, 12 n.2.

225. Id. at 12 n.4.
226. Id. at 9.
227. Id.
228. Id.; Cheyne, supra note 222, at 408.
229. Llewelyn, Computers, Software & InternationalProtection, 11 COLUM. J. L. &
ARTS 183, 183 (1986).
230. COMPUTERS AND LAW, supra note 223, at 9.
231. Cheyne, supra note 222, at 408-09.
232. Id. at 408 (quoting the WHrrE PAPER, supra note 59).
233. Id.
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starting with an out-of-date copyright law, courts wrestled with extending the statutory definitions; then, the government established
committees to study the problem; and finally, all three governments
amended their copyright laws to include software as a copyrightable
work. In addition to these three nations, two other major common law
jurisdictions, Australia and South Africa, followed the trend of making
software copyrightable. 234 As detailed above, the case law from these
two countries affected the outcome of the Canadian resolution. s
Moreover, since the United Kingdom Copyright Act of 1956 has been
extended to Hong Kong, most of the discussion of the United Kingdom
in this Article applies equally to Hong Kong.2s Thus, the international
standard for common law jurisdictions is to grant copyright protection
to software.
2. France
After the U.S., France is one of the largest participants in the world
software market.23 7 Like the U.S. and Canada, France first tried to deal
with software under its old Copyright Act. Eventually, the government
was forced to amend the copyright laws in order to resolve confusion in
2
the courts and bring the laws technologically up to date. 38
The French Copyright Act of March 11, 1957 did not mention computer software. 23 9 Contradiction and judicial activism characterized the
initial cases that came before the French courts. Two different appellate courts reached opposite conclusions regarding the applicability of
the 1957 Act to software. 240 In 1986, the French Supreme Court finally
granted copyright protection to software, finding that the program must
have "originalite." The Supreme Court (La Cour de Cassation) defined
"originality" in the software context as being the "existence of an 'intellectual contribution.' "241 The court excluded aesthetic factors in decid2 42
ing the copyrightability of programs.
The French government, like its counterparts in other industrial234. See Greguras & Riff, An Overview of Australian IntellectualProperty Law for the
PROTECTION Sept. 1987, at 13, 14.
235. See supra notes 80, 84, 124 and accompanying text; see also Prasinos, Int'7 Protection of Computer Programs,26 IDEA 173, 174 n.6 (1984); COMPUTERS AND LAW, supra note
223, at 12 n.4.
236. Prasinos, supra note 235, at 186.
237. Correa, supra note 197, at 23.
238. du Mesnil de Rochemont, Copyright and Fair Trade Laws Against Software
Piracyin European Civil Law Countries, SOFTWARE PROTECTION Sept. 1987, at 1, 4.
239. Id.
240. Id. (Judgement of June 4, 1984, Cours d'appel; Judgement of Nov. 2, 1982, Cours
d' appel).
241. Correa, supra note 197, at 27 (quoting the court).
242. du Mesnil de Rochemont, supra note 238, at 4.

U.S. Electronics Industry, SOFTWARE
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ized states, empowered a commission to study the legal problems and
make recommendations to amend the copyright laws. In 1984, the National Institute of Industrial Property recommended a sui generis form
of protection, similar to the Canadian White Paper and the Japanese
Ministry for International Trade and Industry ("MITI").m The resulting amendment provides a unique form of protection. This protection is
essentially a modified form of copyright. The French government
opined that the amendment was only a temporary measure, designed to
resolve the issue until a better form of software protection could be developed. 24 4 This opinion reflects the French view that software is a
more utilitarian intellectual contribution than a creation in the aes245
thetic sense.
The amendment explicitly includes software as a copyrightable
work and delineates the rights of the copyright holder. The protection
term is twenty-five years, as opposed to the traditional term of "life plus
fifty." 24 The new copyright law expressly denies the author any
"moral rights" which are normally granted under French copyright law.
The lack of moral rights results from the belief that developments in
the field of software technology could be severely hampered by unfettered application of moral rights which would allow the repeal of
licenses due to unauthorized modifications. 247 The software provisions
allow for archival copies, which is a common privilege granted under
most nations' laws.3
The French law also provides the copyright
holder the right to prevent or control the "use" of the program. This is
a power not normally associated with copyright law but rather with patent law.249
The French resolution to the technico legal revolution was to provide sui generis protection which balanced the rights of the software
author, along with third parties. 2 5° The protection is a modified form of
copyright, because patent law is involved through the grant of power
over use of the software. The French government departed from the
trend set by the common law jurisdictions. France did not completely
bow to the desires of the software producers, but balanced the producers' needs for protection against the interests of third parties and future software developers. The French attitude that an even better
243.
196, at
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Correa, supra note 197, at 26; See WHITE PAPER, supra note 59; Note, supra note
529-31 (detailed discussion of the MITI proposal).
Correa, supra note 197, at 26.
Id.
Nimmner & Krauthaus, supra note 198, at 752-53.
Id,
Id. at 753.
Id.
Id. at 752.
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protection system remains to be found is forward-looking and reflects a
deeper understanding of this technico legal revolution than exhibited by
the Canadian, U.S., and British legislators.
3.

West Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany also went through the now fa-iliar pattern of this technico legal revolution. Initially, court decisions
construed the original German Copyright Act of 1965 to include protection for software.2 1 These cases culminated in a landmark decision by
the Federal Supreme Court on May 9, 1985.22 Finally, like the other
industrialized states, Germany amended its copyright laws on June 24,
1985 and affirmatively granted copyright protection to software.2z 3
In deciding its copyright case, the Federal Supreme Court eliminated the confusion among the lower courts. For example, in 1981, the
Mannheim District Court rejected copyright protection for software,
while the Mosbach District Court found that software qualified for
copyright protection.25 Similarly, the Munich District Court categorized software as a linguistic work and, thus, under the protection of the
Copyright Act.2 5 A year later, the same court changed its legal standard and allowed copyright to protect programs which revealed personal, intellectual creation. This is a relatively high requirement for
originality in the software context.256 The Karlsuhe Regional Appeal
Court agreed with this standard, finding that, in principle, software was
257
entitled to copyright protection.
In resolving the copyright issue, the Federal Supreme Court relied
heavily on the theories of the Chairman of the Senate, Mr. von Gamin.
The reliance strengthened the impact of the decision by providing implicit legislative support to the judicial conclusion. 2 8 The court allowed
software protection under copyright law, but placed a high threshold
test of creativity for the software to benefit from the law's protection. 259
The court established a two-step test for ascertaining whether the program has the required degree of "creative individuality" to be afforded
protection. The first test is for "individuality," and the second test is for
251. Note, supra note 196, at 536.
252. See Rottinger, Legal Protection of Computer Programs in Germany: Renunciation of Copyright?, SOFT ARE PROTECTION Sept. 1987, at 8-11 (court accepts copyright in
programs but only for programs that represent "outstanding achievement").
253. Id. at 11-12.
254. Note, supra note 196, at 537; Prasinos, supra note 235, at 203.
255. Note, supra note 196, at 537.
256. Id. at 538.
257. 1l
258. See Rottinger, supra note 252, at 9.
259. Id. at 9-10.
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"creativity." Together, these two tests establish whether a program has
"creative individuality" and, thus, deserves copyright protection.3 °
In order to meet the "individuality" prong of the test, the party
seeking copyright protection must go beyond mere "mechanical and
technical procedures and development." 261 If the "individuality" test is
met, the party must then meet the second prong, "creativity." The
court set a high standard for creativity, stating that "average ability,
that is, the purely manual or mechanical and technical aspect, is not
covered by copyright law." 262 The court further stressed that copyright
protection "assumes a clearly outstanding creativity in selection, collection, organization, and division of the material and directions compared
to the general and average ability." 263 The court excluded considerations such as the effort involved in creating the program, the length of
2 4
the program, the cost and the novelty of the program, from its test. 6
Thus, only extraordinary programs will be protected by German
copyright.
The German government expressly clarified the copyrightabiity of
software in its Copyright Amendment Act of 1985. As in Canada, the
government established a committee to recommend solutions to the issue. The Committee on the Economy brought the resulting amendment
to the Lower House of the German Parliament. 265 The Copyright Act
now extends to "programs for data processing." This language was inserted into Section 2, § 1, line 1 of the Act.26 Germany grants copyrights for the life of the author plus seventy years. 267 While this closes
the door on the question of copyrightability of software, it does not alter
the "creative individuality" requirement that the Supreme Court established. Moreover, the new law does not allow for archival copies of pro26
grams. Private copying for any reason is now illegal. 8
German law still presents problems to those parties seeking copyright protection there. First, it is still not clear that programs embedded on a ROM chip are protected by copyright. 269 Also, the extremely
high standard of creativity that is required remains undefined. Perhaps
the most nebulous concept is the determination of the "average
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id.
Id. at 9 (quoting the court).
Id. at 9-10.
Id, at 10.

IM

265. Id. at 11.

266. Id.
267. Llewelyn, supra note 229, at 191 (compare this to other jurisdictions, such as the
U.K, which only extend protection for life plus fifty years).
268. Id
269. Note, supra note 196, at 538-39.
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programmer" against whom courts are to judge software.270 Even
though copyright protection exists, it is possible that the scope of such
protection could be very narrow. Under its Staatsexamensarbeitdecision, the Federal Court of Justice implied that it would be legal to circumvent copyright protection by transforming an original program into
"a slightly modified linguistic version."' 271
The ultimate result of Germany's recent revisions is, perhaps, a renunciation of copyright protection. The overall effect of the system in
Germany, with its high creativity requirement and narrow scope of protection, is that software is protected "in theory but not in practice. ' '272
As the second civil law jurisdiction examined, Germany, although allowing copyright protection for software, has defined that protection in
terms that are significantly different from the protection allowed in
common law jurisdictions.
4. Other European Community Members
Other European Community members have also moved toward following the international trend. These countries include: the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Denmark, and Portugal. Most of these
states are undergoing the technico legal revolution, but with slightly
different outcomes. Significant discord exists between levels of
software protection within the E.C., even though these countries are going to be unified in 1992 into one common community. This underscores the tension and difficulty of implementing copyright to a new
technology and shows how hard it is to gain worldwide compliance for
the same legal standard.
Belgium has yet to undergo the technico legal revolution. No Belgian court decisions nor amended laws explicitly cover software. However, it is generally accepted that the current Copyright Act protects
. 3
software 27
Denmark, on the other hand, is in the midst of this technico legal
revolution. Software is protected by Danish copyright laws, as long as it
meets the standards of individuality and quality required of all copyrightable materials. 274 The Danish government also established a commission to study this problem and recommend revisions of the
applicable laws. The commission recommended that software should be
270. Rottinger, supra note 252, at 10.
271. Note, supra note 196, at 538; compare Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Labs, 797
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) with F & I Retail Systems Ltd.
v. Thermoguard Automotive Products Can. Ltd., 1 C.P.R.3d 297 (Ont. H. 1984); see also
Fisk, supra note 20, at 178-79.
272. See Rottinger, supra note 252, at 12.
273. du Mesnil de Rochemont, supra note 238, at 5.
274. Id.
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5
considered a separate category of copyrightable works.27
Italy is also currently undergoing this technico legal revolution.
The Copyright Act of April 22, 1941 does not mention software or computers. 276 However, software can be protected if copying involves an
unfair trade practice. In 1983, the ATARI (Bertolino Bros.) v. SIDAM
court decided that software could be protected from slavish imitation.2 7
In addition, software can also be protected through copyright. Another
court in Turin extended copyright protection to video game software because it satisfied the creativity and intellectual quality requirements established by the copyright laws.278 If software is copyrightable in Italy,
the copyright holder is entitled to economic, publication, reproduction,
translation, and moral rights for the usual term of "life plus fifty
years."279
The Netherlands copyright laws do not explicitly address software.
But court opinions unanimously grant copyright protection to software,
as long as the program satisfies the requirements within the Copyright
Act.2 ° There is a move toward amending the copyright laws. A recent
survey revealed that 100% of software suppliers favored amending the
copyright laws in order to affirmatively extend protection to
software.281 The push to amend the laws is underscored by the fact that
the Netherlands loses approximately DFl's 50 Million a year to piracy.
Piracy is estimated to drain 10% of gross revenues, and if unchecked, it
is expected to grow 60% per year. 28 2 It appears that the Netherlands is
entering the Conflict Stage of its technico legal revolution.
Portugal has not directly addressed the copyright protection issue.
Copyright protection for software is apparently unavailable in
2s
Portugal. 3
Spain, like most other nations, has an old copyright system which
does not explicitly mention software. The Copyright Act of 1879 has
not been amended to extend protection to computer programs. Instead,
Spain chose to protect software under Article 10(1) of its proposed new
law dealing with intellectual property rights.284

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Id
Prasinos, supra note 235, at 205.
du Mesnil de Rochemont, supra note 238, at 5.
Prasinos, supra note 235, at 205.
du Mesnil de Rochlemont, supra note 238, at 4-5.
Borking, Results of a Socio-Legal Survey Regarding the Legal Protection of

Software, SOFTWARE PROTECTION, Nov. 1987, at 1, 8.

282. Ild.
283. du Mesnil de Rochemont, supra note 238, at 5.
284. Id.
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5. Non-Member European States
The European states which are not currently members of the E.C.
conform to the E.C.'s push towards harmonizing laws. Just as most of
the E.C. provides some form of protection to software, the same is true
in Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden and Finland, as well as Switzerland and Austria.
In 1986, the Austrian High Court extended copyright protection to
software. 2a 5 By contrast, Switzerland, like Portugal, does not provide
any direct protection for software. The Swiss courts will, however, protect a software manufacturer against an unfair trade practice. Piracy
2s
often involves an unfair trade practice.
In Scandinavia, both Finland and Sweden are working toward
resolving this technico legal revolution. In both nations, the Copyright
Acts do not explicitly mention software; however, most programs would
probably be viewed as protectable work. 2s 7 There are no Finnish court
decisions on point. However, in Sweden the government established a
commission to recommend amendments to the copyright laws. The
commission recommended protecting programs as a separate category of
works under the Copyright Act. The protection will extend to any program that is the "result of mental creativity," regardless of what form
the program takes. Object code would be protected. Like under the
German system, the commission also recommended prohibiting archival
copying for personal use. 2s8
C.

JAPAN

The Japanese government followed the now-familiar pattern of
resolving the protection problem. The Japanese courts tried to extend a
vague copyright law to cover software. Following the attempts by the
courts, the legislature finally considered amending the applicable laws.
After receiving recommendations from two commissions studying the
problem, Japan adopted full copyright protection.
Japan almost followed the route that France took, but ultimately
rejected sui generis protection. 289 Where France ultimately adopted a
modified form of copyright protection, Japan came close to adopting a
modified form of patent protection. Unlike France, however, Japan
came under tremendous international pressure and eventually abandoned the novel proposal.
The Copyright Law of 1970 protected "works of authorship," but
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
Id.
Id
du Mesnil de Rochemont, supra note 238, at 5.
See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 198, at 752.
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did not explicitly mention software. Under the Copyright Law, the industry argued that software qualified as "literary works of a scientific
nature.""
In Taito KK v. K.K ING Ent, a 1982 case, the Tokyo District Court held that object code was a protected reproduction. 29 1 As in
most other industrialized nations, copyright protection of software in
Japan was granted by courts who were willing to extend the meaning of
the copyright laws.
The Japanese government established two different commissions to
study this technico legal revolution. Essentially the two commissions
differed in their perspectives on what rights were more important for
software. The first commission, established under the Education Ministry's Agency for Cultural Affairs ("ACA"), took the approach that an
intellectual property right was more appropriate for software. The
ACA recommended full copyright protection to software under the
traditional terms and with the traditional rights. The second commission, established under the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI"), thought that an industrial property right was more
appropriate for software. Thus, MITI recommended adopting a form of
29 2
patent protection.
MITI was the subject of a great deal of controversy and international pressure. Mirroring the position of the Canadian White Paper,
MITI recommended a sui generis form of protection, called Program
Rights Law, which was a modified form of patent protection. 293 MITI
proposed that protection be granted for only fifteen years without any
originality or creativity requirement. 29 4 MITI also proposed protecting
programs in whatever form they appeared. Object code and programs
embedded on ROM chips were protected. 295 MITI's proposal eliminated
moral rights, required registration and deposit or disclosure of the program's function, and full public disclosure where it was in the public
interest. 296
MITI's proposal received a generally negative reaction. 297 "In 1984
and the early part of 1985, much of the computer industry's lobbying
290. Note, supra note 196, at 527 (citing MITI, A Registration and Certification Type
of System to Protect Computer Programs, MITI BULL., June 5, 1972, reprintedin 5 COMPUTER L. SERv. § 9-4, art. 3, at 3 (1979)).
291. Prasinos, supra note 235, at 206.
292. Note, supra note 196, at 528-32; Higashima & Ushiku, A New Means of International Protectionof Computer Programs Through the Paris Convention-A New Concept
of Utility Model, 7 COMPuTER/L.J. 1, 2-4 (1986).
293. Llewellyn, supra note 229, at 187-88.
294. Id.; Note, supra note 196, at 529-30.
295. Note, supra note 196, at 529-30.
296. Llewelyn, supra note 229, at 188.
297. Note, supra note 196, at 531.
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energy was directed against [MITI]." 298 The main objection to MITI's
proposal was the shorter protection term in conjunction with the
mandatory disclosure. "The proposal was seen in other countries, however, as threatening the viability of traditional confidentiality protection, as a scheme through which Japanese nationals could unfairly
appropriate the work of others." 29 The U.S opposed the proposal because the mandatory and complete disclosure provisions would have increased Japan's competitive advantage over the U.S. Since Japan uses
more U.S.-made software than it exports, this proposal would generally
advance the Japanese software industry without hurting the domestic
industry as much as foreign manufacturers.3so The U.S. exhibited its
opposition when the industry threatened to file suit to restrict the sale
of Japanese software, so l presumably under Section 301 of the U.S.
Trade Act of 1974.302
In the face of "considerable pressure from the United States," the
Japanese government withdrew the MITI proposal.~30 Although there
were calls for Japan to adopt other forms of protection, so 4 the government acceded to the demands of international political and industrial
pressure. In 1985, Japan adopted what was essentially the ACA recom305
mendations and extended full copyright protection to software.
Software is now protected in Japan as a copyrightable work for the
term of life plus fifty years.
D.

RECENTLY INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS

There are a number of nations which have recently begun to develop software industries. These recently industrialized states, for the
most part, adopted software technology first by copying. These countries became the notorious software pirate havens, where markets such
as the Golden Arcade could spring up and distribute bootlegged versions
of software. 3°0 It should come as no surprise that the laws of these nations were relatively liberal in the amount of protection they afforded
298.
299.
300.
301.

Llewellyn, supra note 229, at 187.
Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 198, at 752.
Note, supra note 196, at 531-32.
Id. (citing U.S. Opposes Japanese Proposalfor Limited Software Protection, 27

PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 424 (Mar. 1, 1984)).

302. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. III, § 301, 88 Stat. 2041 (1974) (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
303. Llewelyn, supra note 229, at 188.
304. Higashima & Ushiku, supra note 292, at 3-4 (advocating use of industrial property

law as protection for software).
305. Dam, supra note 214, at 636 (citing Law for Partial Amendment to the Copyright
Law, Law No. 62 of June 1985 (effective Jan. 1, 1986)).
306. Churbuck, Software Piracy Runs Wild at the Golden Arcade, PC WEEK, Nov. 11,
1986, at 217, col. 1.
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software manufacturers. Only as a result of intense U.S. pressure have
these countries recently begun to reform their laws. However, such reform is by no means complete and has, in some cases, encountered stiff
opposition for economic and nationalistic reasons.
South Korea's Copyright Act of 1957 does not explicitly mention
software. As a result of being a civil law country, the Ministry of Culture and Information has refused to register software copyrights. 3° In
30 8
addition, as of 1985, there were no judicial decisions on this issue.
The Copyright Act discriminated against foreign-produced works which
encouraged the copying of foreign works. The Copyright Act of 1957
only protected foreign works which were first published in Korea.
Since foreign software producers cannot, as a matter of course, succeed
in getting initial publication in Korea, no Korean copyright will issue
for foreign works. Moreover, Korea has not adopted either the Berne
Convention or the Uniform Copyright Convention.3°
This state of the law was completely unsatisfactory from the United
States' point of view. As with Japan, the U.S. exerted a great deal of
pressure on Korea to protect foreign software. In 1984, the U.S. conditioned Korea's further participation in the General System of Preferences program on improvements in Korean protection of intellectual
property.3 1 0 Furthermore, the lack of protection caused a trade imbalance such that the U.S. took action on behalf of its software industry.
Korea was subjected to the actions that Japan was only threatened
with-namely action under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.311
These measures have led commentators to predict that copyright re31 2
form in Korea would take place within three years.
Brazil is a nation which explicitly decided not to protect foreign
software in order to further the growth of its own domestic software industry.3 13 Brazil implemented its national information policy by deferring protection for software. This created a legal system which ensured
3 14
that technology would be transferred into and retained by Brazil.
Under Brazilian law, software is not covered by copyright. Instead
software was supposed to be protected by specific laws passed by the
National Congress. No laws have ever been passed, leaving software
307. Lee, Protectionof Software in Korea CurrentRemedies, FutureLaws and the InternationalPerspectiveon Korean Policy, SOFTWARE PROTECTION, Dec. 1985, at 6, 9.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 11.
311. Dam, supra note 214, at 635-36.
312. Lee, supra note 307, at 9, 12.
313. Mille, Software Protectionin the Latin American Countries, SOFTwARE PROTECTION, Dec. 1985, at 1, 2.

314. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 198, at 740.
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unregulated. 3 15
As in Korea, this state of the law was unacceptable to the United
States. The U.S. exerted pressure on Brazil to accede to the international trend. The U.S. initiated action against Brazil under Section 301
of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974.316 As a result, Brazil recently reached a
pact by which it agreed to adopt software protection rules specifically to
safeguard U.S. software manufacturers. 317 Brazil is also studying proposals to amend its protection laws. One proposal is essentially the
same as the Japanese MITI proposal, granting protection for only fifteen years and requiring full public disclosure. 318 Even in this nation
which was adamantly against protecting software, the pressures of
resolving this international problem overcame the government's opposition to protecting software.
The Republic of China, Taiwan, presents another example of U.S.
pressure forcing a resolution of this technico legal revolution. Taiwan
319
was another notorious market and workshop for the software pirates.
In 1980, the Taiwanese government began to study possible amendments to the Chinese Copyright Law of 1964. U.S. pressure resulted in
a 1985 amendment to the copyright laws, which specifically granted protection to computer programs under article 4 of the laws. 320 The term
of protection is thirty years. 321 This is much shorter than the term
granted by the common law jurisdictions. 322 The scope of Taiwanese
protection proved to fall short of U.S. expectations. Early in 1989 the
U.S. and Taiwan completed negotiations and established a plan to bring
Taiwanese copyright law more in line with the international trend of
"life plus fifty."3

23

The new Taiwanese law, once implemented, should

improve software protection.
Malaysia's legal regime does not protect software. In Malaysia, a
court declared that "Malaysia is under no legal obligation whatsoever to
protect copyright of works originated in foreign countries." 324 More315. Mille, supra note 313, at 3.
316. Dam, supra note 214, at 635-36.
317. Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 198, at 740 n.18.
318. Mille, supra note 313, at 3.
319. Minor, Dazed By Lawsuits, Scrappy Taiwan Firms Keep Punching, PC WEEK,
Jan. 29, 1985, at 46.
320. Chang, Computer Software Protectionin the Republic of China (Taiwan), 7 CoMPTrrER/L.J. 455, 461 n.38 (1987).
321. IAewelyn, supra note 229, at 191.
322. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see supra note 204 and accompanying text.
323. Lachica, U.S., Taiwan Set Accord Formula For Copyright Law, WALL ST. J., Jan.
30, 1989, at B6, col. 6.
324. Wilder, The Status of Foreign Copyright Protection in Malaysia, 26 IDEA 1, 1
(1985) (quoting Asia Television Ltd., et aL v. Mega Video Recording Supply Centre, High
Court of Malaysia, Commercial Division, C1713 (1983)).
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over, Malaysia does not adhere to either the Berne Convention or the
Uniform Copyright Convention. Malaysia has allowed "an open season
on piracy of copyrightable subject matter of foreign origin," especially
325
software.
The situation is much the same in Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand
and Argentina. The rampant piracy has resulted in software markets
that severely undercut the legitimate software vendors. 326 These nations are "not yet up to the standards available elsewhere." 327 Presumably, the U.S. will eventually turn its attention to pressuring these
nations to reform their software protection laws. There seems to be a
dawning realization that software protection better serves long-term
interests. 32s
E.

OTHER NATIONS

Although the preceding sections outline software protection among
most of the active players in the world software market, there are a
handful of other nations who deserve some mention. Further study is
needed in this area, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
Since the People's Republic of China had recovered from the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, until the recent unfortunate events in
Tiananmen Square, there was an increase in awareness of the demands
of modernization and more open contact with the West. As a reflection
of this awareness, China had embarked on several legislative ventures
designed to attract foreign capital investment and technology. China
understands that, in order for its domestic software industry to grow, it
must protect the investment that goes into the development of products. 329 As of 1987, China considered new copyright laws in its effort to
modernize by protecting intellectual property.330 These initiatives also
serve as an example for other Socialist nations which may want to open
up their markets to high-tech joint ventures, products and services, such
as software.
Bulgaria and Hungary are two notable Socialist countries who have
attempted to protect intellectual property. Hungary is strengthening its
protection laws to foster the development of its software industry.331
The Hungarian regulations define "software," which may render the
325. Id.at 2.
326. Minor, supra note 319. Copies of expensive software can be bought in Taiwan for
ten dollars.
327. Dam, supra note 214, at 635.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 632.
330. Id. at 635.
331. Id. at 632.

1990]

CANADA, COPYRIGHT, COMPUTERS

laws obsolete in the face of future technological advances.3 32 The Bulgarian protection system involves special administrative rules which
were established in 1979. 3 3 Along with the U.S. and the Philippines,

Bulgaria was one of only three nations to protect software before
1983.334 The Socialist states of Bulgaria and Hungary, cognizant of the
value of software, established protection even before nations with
highly developed software industries.
In other Socialist states and under-developed countries, factors unrelated to intellectual property has inhibited the development of both
computer industries and comprehensive software protection systems. In
the Socialist bloc nations, political differences with the West, especially
with the U.S., has hindered widespread diffusion of computer-related
goods and software. Although the Soviet Union adheres to the Uniform
Copyright Convention,m and seven Eastern European nations are
members of the Berne Convention, 3s 6 the software industries in these
countries are still in the developmental stages. In addition to being politically at-odds with the Western states, Non-Market Economies possess fundamentally different views on copyright. "Communist
governments are traditionally hostile toward private ownership of intellectual property. Marxist-Leninist philosophy considers intellectual
creations and inventions as products of the society. 3 3 7 Thus, political
and economic considerations have had a greater effect on trade with
these states than do considerations on copyright.
Collaterally, under-developed nations are plagued by a different set
of problems which impede the development of software trade. Before
the Third World can solve the problems of copyright protection for
software, the various governments must solve more basic issues of
human needs. Developments in software protection among other states
has only marginal relevance to the immediate future of the Third
World.
For example, in sub-equatorial Africa, where political, economic,
and subsistence problems still exist, there are few incentives to encourage the development of a software industry. "Direct food aid and
332. Correa, supra note 197, at 28.

333. Id. at 24.
334. Id. at 23.
335. Prasinos, supra note 235, at 232; Boytha, The Berne Convention and the Socialist
Countries with ParticularReference to Hungary, 11 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 57 (1986)
(U.S.S.R. joined 1952 text of Uniform Copyright Convention in 1973).
336. The seven socialist member states of the Berne Convention are: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. Boytha, supra note
335, at 57.
337. Chuang & Thurston, Technology Takes Command: The Policy of the People'sRepublic of China with Respect to Technology Transfer and Protectionof Intellectual Property, 21 INT'L LAW. 129, 142 (1987).
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agricultural aid are in the short term much more likely to be offered to
Africa than investment in industry." 3 8 African nations are greatly influenced in how they deal with intellectual property rights by economics, geography, politics, and history. "The politicians must deal with
underlying instability problems of Africa before intellectual property
practitioners can fulfill their function of assisting industrial clients to
build a base of intellectual property rights from which they can develop
339
their manufacturing and trading activities in Africa.
V.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

International Conventions are among the alternatives that have
been considered to resolve the software protection problem. In 1971,
the United Nations began a study on how best to protect software, while
simultaneously facilitating the dissemination of computer programs to
developing nations.340 The two relevant international copyright conventions, the Berne Convention and the Uniform Copyright Convention, do
not explicitly address software.341 The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), which administers the Berne Convention, began
42
discussions on international protection methods in the early 1970's.3
WIPO established an Advisory Group of Non-Governmental Experts,
who met in Geneva. These discussions promulgated the WIPO Model
Provisions of the Protection of Computer Software in the late 1970's
43
and early 1980's.3
The WIPO Model Provisions define "computer program" and
"software." 3 " In addition to copying rights, the Model Provisions include concepts from Trade Secret law.345 The Model provisions extend
rights protecting software for a maximum of twenty-five years.3 46 The
protected software developer is given the rights to control use of the
program, disclosure of the program, development of other "substantially similar" programs from the protected program, and translations
47
of the program from one computer language to another.3
338. Bacon, Intellectual Property Rights in Sub-Equatorial Africa, 2 CAN. INTELL.
PRop. REv. 290, 294 (1986).
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343.
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Prasinos, supra note 235, at 195.
See Berne Convention, supra note 4; U.C.C., supra note 3.
Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 198, at 750.
Prasinos, supra note 235, at 195, 239-40; Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 198, at
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Id at 196 n.125.
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The WIPO proposals have never been enacted by any nation. 34
The proposals do, however, help establish and reflect the evolution of
the international norm. In 1983, WIPO promulgated a draft treaty for
international protection. 349 The treaty adopted a national treatment
principle for software and established a term of protection of twenty
years. 3- Like the Model Provisions, the draft treaty's sui generis protection system was not adopted. A substantial number of nations did
not believe the treaty was necessary because copyright protection was
35 1
adequate.
Most recently, WIPO and UNESCO convened a group of experts to
reconsider amending the Berne Convention or the Uniform Copyright
Convention to include specific software provisions.M2 The consensus at
that time was that both treaties already covered software and no
amendments were needed. 353 Although no WIPO provisions have ever
been explicitly adopted, the organization and the relevant conventions
serve as a guide for studying this problem.
Canada joins the U.S., Japan, the U.K., Australia and West Germany by granting full copyright protection to software. But note that in
the E.C. there are different theories underlying copyright. In common
law jurisdictions, copyright is treated primarily as a matter of economic
rights. In civil law, continental European states, there is more a sense
that copyright stems from "droit d'auteur," and is therefore grounded in
a moral right. This is a fundamental clash of values and theories. The
disharmony that exists in levels of protection among just the Western
industrialized nation highlights the problems with overextending the
copyright system.
The state of the law with respect to an international approach to
software protection is still uncertain. The resolutions discussed above
have been reached very recently, especially in Canada, where the Copyright Act amendment only came into force in 1988. Thus, the world situation could change within another decade. A lack of a clear worldwide consensus also keeps the state of law unclear. Although copyright
is the international trend, it is by no means unanimous. The U.S. is the
only nation which is actively pushing for copyright protection, which is
understandable in light of its investment and dominance in that industry. The indeterminative state of the law is perhaps best illustrated by
the developments in the two nations, other than the U.S., with major
software industries, Japan and France. In the former nation, the gov348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 198, at 751.
Id. at 750.
Id.
Id,
Dam, supra note 214, at 636.
Id.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. X

ernment came close to adopting a different legal scheme to protect
software, and, in the latter state, the government did. Clearly then, this
world-wide technico legal revolution is not over.
In conclusion, these differing approaches to software protection underscore the lack of clarity in this field. There is a definite international trend, but it is not a majority view. Indeed, the trend may even
be slowing down, now that most countries which have software industries are now more or less the same. Also, the trend may be slowing
due to systemic inertia. First, there is difficulty in overcoming the inertia that permeates this issue in countries that have little or no interest
in it. And second, there is a certain amount of inertia that is inherent
in any legal system which must be overcome.
VI.

IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Trade is affected by domestic laws as well as tariffs and more traditional commercial regulations. "[I]ntellectual property rights have as
much significance domestically as they have internationally."-' 4 The
rise in importance of Non-Tariff Barriers and the concomitant lowering
of tariffs worldwide has thrust issues like intellectual property protection into the spotlight of international trade. The Uruguay Round of
the GATT is scheduled to discuss this issue.35 Intellectual property
rights have always been tools of national policies. "And so it is that
trade may be affected by decisions of nations as to what subject matter
will be protected in one country and in a neighbouring [sic] country, and
upon the extent of the rights to be conferred by the national laws." 3
Free trade relies on a harmoniously balanced interchange of laws.
Because trade imbalance can be caused by differing levels of protection,
the foregoing survey of software protection illuminates how trade patterns develop. High technology trade is becoming important as more
countries develop their domestic industries and compete in the world
market. High-technology industries are experiencing the largest growth
world-wide of any industry. Consequently, nations must successfully
exploit these industries if they wish to have healthy economies. 357 This
underscores the need for successful economies to develop better products, protect them, and market them to nations where the technology
354. Cote, The Importance of Intellectual Property in Trade Between Canada and the
United States, 11 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 7, 8 (1986).
355. Kennedy, The Accession of the Soviet Union to GATT, J. WORLD TRADE L., Apr.
1987, at 23.
356. Hayhurst, Some Background to Intellectual Property Rights in Relation to Trade
Between the United States and Canada,4 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REv. 202, 203 (1988) [hereinafter Background].
357. McGeer, Address by the Hon. Dr. Patrick L. McGeer, 1 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REv.
417, 418 (1984).
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will not be pirated. Especially in the software industry, businesses need
"to be able to trade with the certainty that technology developed at
great effort and expense will be protected." a
A. TRADE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Canada and the United States are, in effect, the world's two largest
trading partners.... The U.S. sells more to the 25 million Canadians
than it does to the 280 million people in the European Economic Community. The province of Ontario takes more American exports than
Japan. This impressive flow of trade is also reflected in the area of intellectual property.359

The U.S. has, for a long time, experienced a large trade surplus with
Canada in high technology products. Canada ranks relatively low
among the major OECD countries in the proportion of its gross national
product that is devoted to research and development expenditures.
"Thus, Canada is a technology importer and, given that the United
States is a net exporter, there can arise both bilateral frictions in trade
and frictions over the degree of protection that should be given to intellectual property." 36
The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement ("FTA") cemented the
close trade relationship shared by these two nations. However, the FTA
did not have a direct impact on computer software trade because the
control of software ownership is determined by domestic laws. Both
states accord each other's citizens national treatment as to ownership of
copyrights.ss 1 The FTA did, however, provide a backdrop for the resolution of this technico legal revolution in Canada. Since Canadian
software copyright protection lagged behind U.S. software copyright
protection, there was pressure for Canada to bring their laws into line
with the U.S. standard. Since both nations now accord full copyright
protection to software, software is treated equally on both sides of the
border. This harmony of domestic laws is in conformance with the
spirit of Free Trade and was influenced by the demands of the FTA.
"Care should be taken not to overemphasize the effects upon transborder trade that intellectual property rights may have."3 62 There is no
substantive discussion of intellectual property specifically in the language of the Canada-U.S. FTA. No substantive provisions are required
primarily because intellectual property laws are resolved domestically.
From a Canadian viewpoint, high technology trade is extremely im358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Cote, supra note 354, at 8.
Id.
Bale, US.-Canada High Technology Trade Issues, 11 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 13, 15 (1986).
Differences, supra note 189, at 118.
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portant. Canada's high-tech industry is growing and depends heavily on
imported technology from south of the border. "Canada is dependent
on [technological] inputs because, like most other nations, it cannot generate all or even a major portion, of the technology it needs from domestic sources." 363 Therefore, laws which facilitate the transfer of
technology between the U.S. and Canada are in Canada's interests. In
order for Canada to approach the U.S. lead in high technology and create an equally energetic domestic industry, American technology must
become diffuse and easily available.
One major problem that Canada faces is its smaller population.
Since Canada's population is roughly only ten percent of the U.S. population, Canadians can only produce a fraction of the highly trained and
skilled technicians and software engineers required by the software industry. However, Canada can easily train and educate Canadians in
leading edge technologies. The main problem is creating viable teams of
technologists. "This is the step in which we fail in Canada. It is taking
the monolayer ability and building scientific teams, sustaining them to
the point where their discovery can compete with others who have been
doing this for years." 364
Canada needs laws and an infrastructure to provide their computer
scientists with the same environment that they would enjoy in the
United States. Harmony between the U.S. and Canadian copyright laws
will help Canada nurture their talented people. "Canada, therefore, has
good domestic reasons for protecting intellectual property by enacting
adequate legislation. It recognizes that such protection provides a necessary incentive to creative activities." 65 If the laws of Canada are such
that it makes no difference whether someone lives in the U.S. or in
Canada, then Canadians will help their domestic industry. "On the
whole, however, in relation to intellectual property rights Canada has
had more open borders than the U.S."' " Thus, Canada created an environment which makes it not merely equally, but actually more attractive for industries to bring technology to Canada.
Canada recognized its particular technological needs and reacted
even more than the U.S. to attract software technology. "The government of Canada is determined to create and maintain a climate in which
new intellectual property and technology can be created and protected. '36 7 Unlike the U.S., Canada kept open the possibility of using
patent protection for software. 3 " As discussed above, this would be an
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Cote, supra note 354, at 8.
McGeer, supra note 357, at 419.
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extra incentive for Canadian industries, since it would give them an exs 9
tra weapon of corporate security.3
Together, patent and copyright
protection may be more attractive than the U.S. protection system. In
this sense, Canada is even more technologically protectionist than the
United States.
This scheme puts the two trading partners on equal terms and can
only enhance cross-border technology flow. This North American resolution will result in an increase in trade. More settled laws help promote stable and predictable business relationships. Now that the U.S.
and Canada are roughly equal in their stances toward software, there
should be an increase in trade. "[Ilntellectual property will be a key
factor in helping to determine the technological and industrial future of
both [the U.S. and Canada], in an increasingly competitive world." 370
The net benefit will be increased technical proficiency for Canada and a
lower trade deficit for the U.S. The future of high-tech trade, at least in
North America, is indeed bright.
B.

TRADE AMONG DEVELOPED NATIONS

European countries differ in the levels of protection they give to
software. With 1992 fast approaching, the European Community must
come to a consensus as to how much protection to give software. "Industrialized nations.., owe a large share of their prosperity to innovation and want to receive a fair price for the technology they have
developed."'37 ' Because some European nations afford little protection
to software, these states will frustrate others who expect a fair price for
their software. This could result in intra-Community tension. The E.C.
countries must resolve their differences.
If the E.C. fails to agree on levels of protection, then the U.S. will
only export technology to those nations, like England and France,
which provide comparable levels of protection to software. The U.S.
will not export software to nations, like Portugal, which provide no protection to software. Yet, in 1992, the free trade of software between the
European states will become a reality. Therefore, nations which fail to
institute safeguards may become havens for pirates, who will obtain
software originating in the U.S. from those European countries with
whom the U.S. trades. The result could be U.S. pressure on the E.C. to
369. Morgan, supra note 57, at 422-23. Extra protection, in the form of copyright or
patent, would be used by the industry as "one more device of industrial security." Id.
(quoting NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TEcHNoLoGIcAL USES OF COPYRIGHT WORKS
(CONTU), FINAL REPORT 1 (1978), at 15).
370. Cote, supra note 354, at 11.
371. Id. at 7.
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adopt uniform laws regarding software as a whole, similar to Canada
and Japan.
Obviously these same concerns govern intra-Community trade.
Those states with developed software industries, like England and
France, will pressure the E.C. states which fail to protect their works.
This pressure, above all, may more effectively harmonize the E.C. approach to software. The E.C. may resent or resist outside U.S. pressure.
372
An integrated and expanded E.C. may hurt U.S. export trade overall.
Therefore, it is in the interests of the U.S. to ensure that E.C. states do
not pirate their software industries.
"It is apparent that the unalloyed exercise of rights arising from indigenous laws providing regimes for the protection of industrial and intellectual property may have anti-competitive effects in terms of the
E.E.C. Treaty [the Treaty of Rome]." 373 As discussed above, some European states view copyright as a purely economic right, while other
states treat copyright as a moral right, designed to protect the creator
for the act of creation. 374 This conflict of laws within the E.C., which
affects trade, is a clash "between competing policies rather than between firm rules. 3 75 The E.C. has moved to harmonize its copyright
laws in order to avoid intra-Community unfair trading. If the E.C. succeeds in harmonizing its copyright laws, freer trade will exist within the
community. 376 Therefore, Europe must achieve a higher degree of uniformity in order to increase software trade as significantly as between
the U.S. and Canada. Unfortunately, "[t]he developments in the field so
far 'give the impression, relatively speaking, of preliminary skirmishes:
it looks as if most of the fundamental problems of copyright in the
Community context are yet to come.' 377
Japan's efforts, like the E.C., to develop its software industry, will
be hampered until they grant full copyright protection to foreign
software. Japan will have to pay more to gain access to U.S. software
technology. Software trade between the U.S. and Japan should increase
for many of the same reasons that software trade will increase between
the U.S. and Canada. The net result may be that while trade between
Japan and the U.S. may increase, domestic production in Japan may
slow down.
Once the E.C. countries agree on their copyright laws, all the major
372. Yannopoulos, United States Trade Interests and EC Enlargement, J. WORLD
TRADE L. Aug. 1987, at 49.
373. McKeough, supra note 217, at 242.
374. Vaver, supra note 216, at 82-83.
375. McKeough, supra note 217, at 242.
376. Id. at 268.
377. Id. at 270 (quoting Harris, Community Law and Intellectual Property: Recent
Cases in the Court of Justice, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV 61-62 (1982)).
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nations will be playing in the same ballpark. The U.S. controls roughly
seventy percent of the world software market.378 While this condition
exists, a level playing field in this area could never be truly reached.
"The U.S. initiatives have generated some feelings abroad that, with
Yankee rectitude, the U.S. wants a level playing field on which the U.S.
is the referee." 379 If the U.S. lobbies every nation to protect software
with copyright for the life of the author plus fifty years, then the U.S.
will hold a de facto perpetual lead over the rest of the world in software
development and accessible library. Naturally, it is in U.S. interests to
gain as much protection for software as possible. On a global scale,
granting full copyright protection to software will lock in the virtual
monopoly that the U.S. has gained.

C. TRADE wITH DEVELOPING NATIONS
As discussed previously, the U.S. government and industries are
lobbying for international improvements in high technology laws. However, these U.S. "efforts have not yet met with universal support, particularly from nations that are in less advanced stages of development, or
from nations that are, as most are, net importers of technology and of
products of the intellect."'
"[D]eveloping nations need access to innovation, and their priority is to acquire new technologies."' l
The Pacific Rim is becoming one of the most active trade areas in
the world. This trend will probably continue well into the next century. The Pacific Rim nations are notorious for the amount of software
pirating they allow. Many of these states have benefited from the pirating by developing domestic industries from the initial pirating companies. For example, Korea is poised to enter the world software
market. 382 Other nations, like Taiwan, have amended their protection
laws because of internal pressure as well as U.S. lobbying. 3s In the Pacific, protection will flow from profit. When domestic manufacturers
start producing software and other works they want protected, those
manufacturers will start to lobby their governments for protection of
such works. Therefore, as trade increases among the Pacific Rim nations, the laws will change. The law will follow the trade patterns. Unlike Europe, where the law will affect the trade patterns, the Pacific
Rim nations' laws will change in response to the trade patterns that
develop.
378.
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Before copyright reform, Canada was the back door through which
Far East copycats penetrated U.S. markets. Canada's amendments to its
copyright laws have closed this door.s s 4 Thus, Canada's trade with developing Asian nations is adversely impacted by the changes in law.
However, since Canada's main trade partner is the U.S., this adverse impact is outweighed by the benefits of increased trade with the U.S.
Brazil is also changing their trade practices. Brazil incurred the
wrath of the U.S., which resulted in action under the Trade Act. The
Brazilian government has reached a point where change is mandated by
the exigencies of international trade.385 When Brazil's domestic industry begins demanding protection for its domestically produced software,
then comprehensive change most likely will accelerate. Like Japan,
Brazil's imports of U.S. software will increase, as the piratical activities
are phased out.
The People's Republic of China wants to modernize and, therefore,
must gain access to foreign technology._8 6 China has also recognized the
need to reform its legal system in order to stimulate foreign investments in China. "Much of the legal reform has been designed to attract
foreign direct financial and technological investment by offering various
incentives and protection to foreign technology and proprietary interests. 3 8 7 As part of its modernization, China is trying to improve its
copyright laws. "China now realizes the importance of a copyright law
in the attraction of foreign technology."" China has joined WIPO and
is currently drafting a copyright law in its efforts to modernize its legal
system. 389 Since China has a desire to import technology, the development of an international consensus regarding copyright protection
might influence China's pace and scope of modernization.
Future international trade will be impacted when China re-attains
its GATT status. "China's request for resumption of its GATT membership constitutes an element of its open trade policy aimed at achieving a
greater degree of integration in the world economy. ''39° GATT provides
384. Copyright reform and anti-counterfeiting efforts can greatly reduce the amount of
pirate software which infiltrates markets. For example, after Taiwan began toughening
its enforcement, the percentage of Taiwanese counterfeit goods confiscated by U.S. Customs Officials fell from 56.1% in 1982 to 2.2% in 1984. Chang, supra note 320, at 462.
385. Dam, supra note 214, at 636. Brazil has been subject to Section 301 trade actions
by the United States.
386. Chuang & Thurston, supra note 335, at 130. Science and Technology is one of the
Four Modernizations of the ruling party's program to transform China into an industrialized socialist democracy.
387. 1& at 131.
388. 1& at 164.
389. 1&
390. Li, Resumption of China's GATT Membership, J. WoRLD TRADE L., Aug. 1987, at
25, 29.
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guidelines and enforcement mechanisms in the case of disputes which
may make trade with China more attractive. China may become a major software producer in the Pacific Rim, and, indeed, in the world, if
the Chinese government can convince investors that foreign technology
will be protected in China.
Traditionally, developing countries accord little deference to foreign copyrights, until they develop their own domestic industry. Governments tend to reform the copyright laws when their domestic
manufacturers start complaining about lack of protection. Thus, the
Third World will resist adopting tough copyright laws so that domestic
industries will develop. Their interests run counter to those of the industrialized states. This will become a source of friction in trade when
the under-developed nations achieve a sufficient level of technology to
391
start impacting the world software market.
D.

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE AND TARiFS

The worldwide trend toward protecting software should be clarified
when GATT addresses the issue. Unfortunately, GATT is not the optimal forum to discuss domestic laws. GATT negotiations will be impacted, perhaps disproportionately, by economic, political, and social
factors. These factors may obscure the legal issues and produce a result
which mutates copyright law into pure trade law. The GATT negotiators may resolve the software protection problem in a legally untenable
manner. Worse yet, they may fail to resolve the problem at all. A noresolution situation will aggravate the situation by fostering an atmosphere of international uncertainty. "[I]ntellectual property rights have
ceased to be the exclusive domain of highly professional expert circles,
such as those meeting at the WIPO. Entering into the open arena of
trade politics, within the GATT and elsewhere, involves both chances
and risks.

' ' 392

Technological advance has spread more quickly than was ever expected. Traditional theories... are being complicated because certain
developing countries have been able to compete with the industrialized
countries on products at the higher end of the technological ladder. It
has become clear to most countries that export success is a function of

their ability to innovate, adapt to new technologies and produce those
393
goods and services for which world demand is increasing.
391. Cote, supra note 354, at 7. The tension between the desire of developing states to
acquire access to innovation and the desire of industrialized states to receive a fair price

for technological development must be balanced.
392. Meessen, Intellectual PropertyRights In InternationalTrade, J. WORLD TRADE L.
Feb. 1987, at 67, 74.
393. Gibbs, The Uruguay Round and the International Trading System, J. WoRLD
TRADE L. Oct. 1987, at 5, 9.
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The fear is that, in an effort to protect economic rights, the industrialized states may go too far. "When does the protection of intellectual
property rights go beyond what is 'adequate' and become an instrument
for market domination?" 394
Because GATT is contractual in nature, it provides a better mechanism to achieve worldwide software protection compliance with
software protection. Unlike the Uniform Copyright Convention or the
Berne Convention, GAIT has a built-in enforcement mechanism. It is
no accident that in the U.S.-Canada FTA, both nations agreed to pressure other states to adopt similar protection schemes through the
GATT. s 95 The enforcement mechanism is the primary attraction for using GATT as a tool to pressure nations to adopt copyright protection for
software, These mechanisms will make it much harder for the Third
World and developing nations to get a foothold in the high-tech world.
They will have to pay royalties and fees for a long time before most
software becomes freeware. The Third World and developing nations
will be hampered and discouraged from entering the Silicon Age. This
condemns a portion of the world to technological naivete and illiteracy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Uniform software copyright protection will enhance high-tech trade
between the developed Western nations because businesses will be assured of equal protection for their products. However, friction in trade
relations will develop from under-developed nations and Communist
states which have refused to protect foreign software products.
The Third World will resist copyright reform because they have no
domestic software industry. A fledgling software industry often grows
from a pirate industry. Under-developed nations, wishing to keep open
the possibility of developing a software industry in the future, will refuse to reform their copyright laws to protect software.
The U.S. government and U.S. industries are pushing for international improvement in high technology laws. The U.S. has successfully
pressured Canada, Japan, Taiwan, and England to conform to the U.S.
model of software protection. U.S. pressure has prompted nations like
3
Korea and Brazil to begin copyright reform. 96
Technology impacts the copyright laws, which in turn impact trade.
Trade injects issues of money, economics, and global politics into the
software protection issue. It is a complex web, full of competing ten394. Id,
395. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Art. 2004. The two countries agreed
to "cooperate in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and in other international forums to improve protection of intellectual property."

396. Dam, suptm note 214, at 636.
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sions. "[In the United States, intellectual property protection matters
are being driven almost as much today by trade policy as by intellectual
property statutes." 397 Copyright law is not the best resolution because
it creates more tension and friction between the industrialized West and
the underdeveloped and developing nations.
Ultimately, U.S. influences will probably get most countries to
adopt copyright protection. "[I]f freedom of trade is an objective, there
is of course much to be said for working for the Utopian ideal of uniformity of [intellectual property] rights in different countries."3 98 However, if this comes about, the U.S. will retain a significant advantage in
software development over the rest of the world. This result is antithetical to the ideal of disseminating technology as quickly and as
widely as possible. If the U.S. is the prime manufacturer of software,
and if this technology is protected for the entire term of a copyright, it
will become very difficult for nations to begin nurturing a successful domestic software industry. Most of the expertise and technical skill for
creating software will remain in the U.S. As a result, the world will
only share in this technology by purchasing it from U.S. producers.
Copyright is used as a means of stifling competition. The trend in
the U.S. case law reveals how copyright can be abused. In the U.S.,
companies are suing in order to restrict their hold on technology and
solidify their market shares. For example, Apple Computer Corporation is suing to retain its technological lead in the personal computer
market.399 The second and third generation lawsuits and software issues all flow directly from the initial grant of copyright. If these companies are allowed to restrict the "look and feel" or underlying basic
structure of a computer program, then legitimate competitive development can be quashed. At first, these manufacturers were concerned
with slavish copying; now, they are using copyright as a tool of industrial security to extend their competitive advantages. "'There is a tendency for copyright lawyers to think . . .that all problems could be
solved if copyright laws were applied wholesale to software.'"400 Unfortunately, copyright creates a number of problems.
If these developments occur on a global scale, software innovation
will be restricted only to the U.S. and only to those companies with the
financial and legal power to protect their products. The pace of
software development will ultimately slow as these companies eradicate
their competition, both domestically and internationally. In the long
397. Bale, supra note 360, at 15.
398. Background, supra note 356, at 208.
399. Schlender, Miller & Carroll, Apple's Copyright Lawsuit Is Seen As Effort to Lock
In Technical Lead, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1988, at 21, col. 4.
400. Llewelyn, supra note 229, at 187 (quoting Rumbelow, Software Protection in the
united Kingdom, 10 INT'L. Bus. LAw. 263 (1982)).
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run, copyright becomes a slippery slope leading to monopolies and technological stagnation.
VIII.

PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR SOFTWARE PROTECTION

The copyright system should be replaced by a more elegant
software protection scheme. Although the exact details of such a protection scheme are beyond the scope of this Article, certain characteristics of the protection problem should serve as useful guidelines in the
future development of software protection.
First, copyright is a temporary solution at best. Perhaps the French
approach is the most realistic. Copyright should be regarded as a stopgap measure, intended to satisfy the demands of manufacturers until
something better suited to the real nature of the technology is
developed.
A wide diversity in protection schemes exist, even between states
that recognize copyright in software. This is a result of different traditions and philosophies underlying copyright. In the long run, the U.S.
should strive to attain sui geners protection, which does not carry with
it conflicting underlying philosophies.
Second, true object code is nothing more than a series of voltages.
Courts have confused "object code" with both "hexadecimal code" and
"machine code." The courts have missed the essential point that both
binary and hexadecimal codes are nothing more than representationsof
the actual sequence of voltages being applied. In essence, object code is
electricity, channelled through the computer's hardware.
Third, copyright overprotects software. Most software does not
have a shelf life of more than a few years. A protection term of life
plus fifty years is much too long for software. An intermediate solution
will emerge, somewhere between patent and copyright terms. Copyright was designed for artistic works, like books, and not for utilitarian,
industrial articles like software. A better protection system should recognize the inherent industrial nature of software. In addition, copyright
underprotects software. Copyright protection would not guard against
use, as patent protection would.
As a matter of priorities, the software industry is worried primarily
about copycats, since they represent the most blatant and damaging attack on the industry. Naturally, because copying is involved in software
piracy, the industry turns first to copyright law. But, this strategy ignores the fact that software is more than just something to copy.
Software is an industrial tool. It has value as a basis for research and
development. It evolves over time as newer versions are introduced to
the marketplace. A protection scheme is needed which adequately protects against slavish copying and simultaneously addresses the other as-
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pects of the technology. Otherwise, the industry will gain different
forms of protection piece by piece, by bringing subsequent lawsuits. An
over-arching approach to software, which recognizes its nature from the
outset, is more desirable than a piecemeal approach to software
protection.
A new protection system should require a level of creativity and
originality above what is required for copyright, but below what is required for patent novelty inquiries. As a trade off for this heightened
originality requirement, the protected software manufacturer should be
given the power to control use of the software. However, moral rights
and "look and feel" complaints should not be allowed. These types of
complaints are currently being used to stifle competition and technological development. Finally, a separate legal regime should protect the
physical devices upon which the program is stored. Object code programs embedded on ROM should be covered, but the actual ROM chip
structure should not be covered. Other protection systems, like the U.S.
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, should cover the actual ROM chip
structure.
A more responsive protection scheme will ensure more compliance
and implementation than exists now. There will be the same trade benefits and protection for the industrialized states, but less harm to the
developing states. The ultimate result will be a fairer, better, and faster
spread of technology on a global scale. This will, in turn, enable more
states to enter the Silicon Age. And finally, an innovative protection
scheme will resolve the international technico legal revolution that encompasses software.
"The only realistic approach, in my opinion, is to attempt to achieve
a fair balance between the rights of innovators and the needs of
users." 40 1 Software needs protection, but copyright is the wrong approach since it underprotects and overprotects. This results in long
term stagnation and strangle holds on development. "Adequate protection of intellectual property rights promotes the expansion of trade,
while abuse of such rights works in the opposite direction: it tends to
impede trade."4° 2
The law is evolving and must adapt to new forms of wealth, property, power, and new realities if it is to guide lives and societies efficiently. Law exists to make life predictable. If the law does not address
a central issue of modern life, then it is no longer relevant and makes
life unpredictable. Common sense dictates that new realities will require new approaches. This is especially important now that it appears
technology will only increase the pace of its rapid advances. The legal
401. Cote, supra note 354, at 7.
402. Id. at 7-8.
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systems of the world must get accustomed to evolving quickly, since future technical advances will require similarly adept adaptation.

